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HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 
SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
The forty-first annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical 
Association was held on Saturday, April 3, 1971, at Clemson Uni­
versity. Approximately 75 members and guests attended one or more 
of the programs. 
Following registration in the faculty room, Strode Tower, the 
first session was called to order at 9:45 a.m. in Olin Hall Auditorium, 
President Henry von Hasseln presiding. Following a short welcoming 
address by President Edwards of Clemson, Diane Neal of the same 
university read a paper on "Ben Tillman: No Apologies for Lynching" 
which was discussed by Joseph H. Killian, Wofford College. Selden K. 
Smith, Columbia College, then read a paper entitled "Cotton Ed 
Smith's Response to Economic Adversity" which was discussed by 
John J. Duffy, University of South Carolina. 
A buffet luncheon was served at 12:30 p.m. in the campus dining 
room, after which the annual business meeting was held. The minutes 
of the last meeting were approved as printed in The Proceedings and 
the Treasurer's report, copies of which were distributed at the lunch­
eon, was adopted. Professor C. W. Bolen, for the Executive Commit­
tee, presented the following slate of officers for 1971-1972: 
President: Ronald D. Burnside, Presbyterian College 
Vice-President: J. M. Lesesne, Jr., Wofford College 
Secretary-Treasurer: Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College 
Executive Committee Member (term to expire 1974): Robert 
Weir, University of South Carolina 
There were no nominations from the floor, and the motion that the 
slate be accepted by acclamation was seconded and passed. It was 
announced that Dr. Ware would continue to serve as Editor of The 
Proceedings next year. 
In Dr. J. M. Lesesne, Jr.'s absence, Dr. George C. Rogers gave a 
brief report on the activities of the Tricentennial Commission. He 
stated that three tourist centers appropriately located on inter-state 
highways, would be operating by July 1st under the State Department 
of Parks and Tourism. He stated further that thirteen historical 
works had been published to date and that a new one-volume history 
of South Carolina would probably be published in 1972—all with as­
sistance from the sub-committee on publications. 
Dr. Ware read a tribute to Dr. Bernard Poole, active member of 
the Association during his long service at Erskine College. The motion 
was made, seconded, and passed unanimously that the tribute be 
made an official part of these minutes, that it be printed in The Pro­
ceedings, and that a copy be sent to surviving members of Dr. Poole's 
family. 
After announcing that the 1972 meeting of the Association would 
be held at Columbia College, the date to be confirmed later, President 
von Hasseln called on President-Elect Burnside who thanked Clemson 
University for its hospitality and cited the excellent work of the local 
arrangements committee, chaired by Professor C. W. Bolen. Dr. Burn-
side also announced that guided tours of the nearby Duke Power 
Company Keowee-Toxaway Project would be conducted following 
the afternoon session. 
The second session began at 2:30 p.m. in Olin Hall Auditorium. 
Papers read were "Executive Powers and Foreign Relations: The 
Neutrality Acts Revisited" by Jamie Moore, The Citadel, discussed 
by Hewitt D. Adams, Clemson University; and "America, Germany, 
and the Cold War, 1945-1949" by Birdsall Viault, Winthrop College, 
discussed by Henry Lumpkin, University of South Carolina. 
Preceded by a social hour, the Banquet Session was convened in 
The Clemson House at 7:30 p.m. Following dinner, Dr. George B. 
Tindall, Kenan Professor of History at the University of North Caro­
lina, Chapel Hill, read a paper entitled "Southern Strategy: A His­
torical Perspective." 
There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned. 
BERNARD L. POOLE 
1908-1971 
Bernard L. Poole was born in Norfolk, Va. on January 2,1908. He 
attended Choate School and graduated from Yale University in 1931. 
During the rest of the decade he was engaged in various business 
activities, and in the Second World War he served in the U. S. Air 
Force. After the war he began an academic career by taking a Mas­
ters' in Spanish at the University of Illinois, and it was as an in­
structor in Spanish that he came to the University of South Carolina 
in 1946. Two years later he began graduate study in history which 
in 1950 led to a PhD. The following year the University of South 
Carolina Press published his doctoral thesis, The Caribbean Com­
mission. 
For one year he taught history at Georgia Teachers College at 
Statesboro, Ga., and from 1951 to 1956 he taught at the College of 
Charleston. From 1956 until his death, January 2, 1971, he was Pro­
fessor of History and head of the department of History at Erskine 
College. There he continued his interest in Latin America, and in 
1957 was the co-author of The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French, 
United States, a volume published by the University of Florida Press. 
When his teaching duties turned his attention toward political sci­
ence, in 1961 he produced a volume on the Basic Minimum of Ameri­
can Government which he used as a text book. 
His interest in teaching more than matched his devotion to 
scholarship, and students were attracted by his distinctive blend of 
formality and wit. 
For two decades Bernard Poole was an active member of the 
South Carolina Historical Association, and his passing is a distinct 
loss to this body as well as to the historical profession in South 
Carolina. 
BEN TILLMAN—NO APOLOGIES FOR LYNCHING 
DIANE NEAL 
Ben Tillman's views concerning lynching have stimulated much 
comment both from his contemporaries and from historians. Often 
repeated statements such as "Whenever the Constitution comes be­
tween me and the virtue of the white women of the South, I say to 
hell with the Constitution"1 convinced many of his contemporaries 
that Tillman was the South's foremost champion of lynch law. Later 
historians have generally shared this opinion, but most of them note 
that as governor of South Carolina he displayed considerable anti-
lynching sentiment until 1892 when he spoke openly in favor of lynch­
ing rapists. Typical of these studies are those by Francis Butler 
Simkins and George Brown Tindall.2 Little attempt, however, has 
been made to analyze the apparent shift in views manifested by Till­
man in 1892. 
Most studies of lynching center on mob psychology and the rela­
tionship of education, wealth, religion, and population to the practice. 
Able scholars have written of the influence of the Southern "rape 
complex" upon lynching. In this paper an effort will be made to 
explore the apparent inconsistencies in Tillman's views concerning 
lynching and to examine those views with particular reference to 
Southern womanhood, sexual behavior, and racial equality. 
The definition of lynching accepted here is James Harmon Chad-
bourn's definition of lynching as "the killing or aggravated injury 
of a human being by the act or procurement of a mob,"3 with at least 
three persons participating in the event, and with the mob acting 
under the pretense of service to race, tradition, or injustice.4 As 
Gunnar Myrdal notes, a distinction must be made between racial 
lynchings and riots. Racial riot indicates mass violence in which 
members of each race fight each other in unrestrained fashion, 
*B. R. Tillman to the editor of the New York Sun, November 4, 1913, Ben­
jamin R. Tillman Papers. Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University, 
Clemson, South Carolina. (All letters cited in this paper are located in this 
collection.) 
2Francis Butler Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian, Baton 
Rouge, 1944, pp. 173-74 and 224-25; George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Ne­
groes, 1877-1900, Baton Rouge, 1966, pp. 250-54. 
3James Harmon Chadbourn, Lynching and the Law, Chapel Hill, 1933, p. 47. 
4Jack Simpson Mullins, "Lynching in South Carolina, 1900-1914", unpub­
lished M. A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1961, p. 2. 
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whereas mass lynching refers to the killing or beating of a large num­
ber of members of either race as a means of terrorization.5 
Ben Tillman's belief that rapists deserved lynching remained 
fundamentally unchanged throughout his political career. Exposed in 
the Senate to his Northern colleagues' indictment of lynch law and 
isolated from the mainstream of South Carolina politics, he enunci­
ated his philosophy more clearly and forcefully than he had as gov­
ernor. His addresses especially during the period of 1906-07 reveal 
how profoundly Tillman was affected by the Southern "rape com­
plex." Since this attitudinal complex influenced many of his actions 
both as a private citizen and as governor, a detailed examination of 
it is necessary. 
As W. J. Cash notes, the origin of this lies in the idealization of 
Southern womanhood which began in the Old South. Although the 
white masters had frequent sexual relations with their slave women, 
they desired to perpetuate white supremacy in legitimate lines, and 
for this reason they idealized women of their own race and placed 
them on a pedestal beyond the reach of black men. Southern white 
males, feeling the need of meeting the Northern charges that they 
were slipping into bestiality by exploiting their black servants sex­
ually, proclaimed Southern virtue superior to any virtue on earth 
and pointed to Southern womanhood as proof.6 
In the eyes of Southern whites like Tillman, the Civil War and 
the abolition of slavery seemed to offer to the blacks an opportunity 
to overthrow this taboo against sexual relations with white women. 
Southerners, therefore, felt that any effort on the part of blacks to 
gain political equality would ultimately lead to social equality and 
intermarriage. Thus any violation of the Southern racial code whether 
or not directly connected with sex could be described as rape upon 
the Southern woman who personified the South.7 
Further study on aspects of the rape complex has been done by 
sociologist Calvin Hernton. He suggests that because the white 
Southern males felt attracted to female slaves they concluded that 
^Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy, New York, 1944, I, 566. _ 
^Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South, New York, 1941, pp. 87-89. For a 
fuller discussion of sexual relations between white masters and their chattels sec 
Winthrop Jordon, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-
1812, Chapel Hill, 1968, pp. 136-167 and 557-75; Rollin G. Osterweis, Romanticism 
and Nationalism in the Old South, New Haven, 1949, pp. 54-60 and 82-102. 
ilbid., pp. 118-19. 
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white women must feel a similar attraction to black men. This factor 
in addition to their guilt about their relationships with black women, 
induced them to stress the idea of pure white Southern womanhood. 
To justify any possible fascination that white women might feel for 
black males, the white Southerners accepted the idea that black men 
possessed greater sexual prowess than they. Somewhat contradic­
torily, they argued that black men repelled white women and there­
fore any contacts between them had to be forced by the former. Thus 
the white woman must be shielded from this ever present threat. A 
correlation to these beliefs was that black women also had very strong 
sexual passions and were attracted to white men. Since these women 
supposedly lacked high moral standards, sexual contacts between 
them and white men were considered voluntary and rarely was it 
thought that white men raped black women.8 
As suggested earlier, the rape complex formed the basis of Till­
man's philosophy of lynching. Central to it was his devotion to the 
pure white Southern woman as a symbol of the South. To illustrate, 
in 1907 he advanced his belief that the trinity of "womanhood, wife­
hood, motherhood" were the "noblest and holiest" words in the Eng­
lish language. He condemned any man who spoke lightly or flippantly 
of the chastity of womanhood as a "disgrace to his own mother and 
unworthy of a good wife."9 Any violation of womanly virtue, he con­
sidered the most serious and despicable of crimes. He put seduction 
in the same class as rape when he announced that the natural pro­
tector of a woman had the right to kill her seducer, and in 1916 he 
urged the pardon of a white man who had shot his daughter's white 
seducer.10 Referring in the same year to the lynching of rapists, he 
declared that "the man, white or black, who forcibly deflowers a 
woman, put himself outside of the pale of the law" and deserves sum­
mary killing.11 
However, his respect for feminine virtue did not extend wholly 
to black women. He proposed that black people as a whole lacked 
morals because their women "did not set ideals for the men to follow 
as in the white man's realm."12 While in numerous speeches he af­
8Calvin C. Hernton, Sex and Racism in America, New York, 1965, pp. 16-17 
and 110-12. 
9U. S. Congress, Senate, Senator Tillman speaking on the race question, 59th 
Cong. 2nd sess., January 21, 1907, Congressional Record, LI, 1441. 
10B. R. Tillman to Richard I. Manning, December 11, 1916 in Tillman Papers. 
HB. R. Tillman to Almonico T. Gary, May 26, 1916, Ibid. 
12Unidentified newspaper clipping, Scrapbook 11 (1906-07), Benjamin R. 
Tillman Papers. Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University, Clemson, 
South Carolina. (All scrapbooks cited are located in this collection.) 
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firmed his belief that any man who had ravished a woman of either 
race deserved lynching, one can question his sincerity in this regard 
for in 1914 when confronted with the attempted rape of a black 
woman by a black male he did not suggest that the culprit be lynched. 
Instead he predicted that the man would probably be imprisoned or 
possibly legally sentenced to death.13 To him most black women pos­
sessed loose morals and welcomed sexual contacts almost indiscrim­
inately ; therefore rapes upon them were few. 
Tillman also regarded black men as possessors of animal-like 
sexual passions. In one of his speeches in 1907 he denounced black 
rapists as "lurking demons who . . . watched for the opportunity to 
ravish lovely young white maidens."14 Since he pictured all black 
men as potential brutes or fiends, earlier the same year he had op­
posed sending black soldiers to serve in the Philippines because doing 
so would place the Filipino women at their mercy. He announced that 
they should be kept in the United States where summary justice 
should be meted out to them as soon as they committed outrages upon 
women. If possible, they should all be mustered out of the armed 
forces.15 
Why, Tillman asked, had the black men developed into such 
brutes? In many of his public addresses in 1906-1907, he suggested 
that the answer lay in the ideas of social equality which the Repub­
licans had been feeding them since Reconstruction. During slavery 
days, black people accepted their inferiority and did not attempt to 
mingle socially with the whites. But, giving blacks political equality 
through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had imbued them 
with the desire to gain social equality including the right to inter­
marry with the whites. To complicate the South's racial problem, 
many white men according to Tillman were crossing the color line 
sexually in defiance of the customs forbidding racial amalgamation, 
leaving the white women to safeguard the purity of the race. "We 
must," Tillman insisted, "protect our women at any and all hazards 
else they would spurn us and . . . we must draw the line of caste 
between white men and black women and sternly compel its observ­
ance, just as sternly as we are resolved to draw the line between 
black men and white women."16 
B- B-Tiltaimn to B R. Tillman, Jr., August 18, 1914 in Tillman Papers. 
"Senator Tillman January 21, 1907, Congressional Record, LI, 1441. 
15Columbia State, January 7, 1907. 
iGAugusta Chronicle, October 7, 1906, Scrapbook 11 (1906-07) in Tillman 
Papers. 
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Tillman's solution for the problems of lynching and raping was 
to repeal the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—the first step 
in eradicating the ideas of political and social equality from the minds 
of blacks. With the repeal of these guarantees of the blacks' legal 
rights, they could be completely subjugated and their movements 
placed under strict police regulation.17 Racial hostility, he continued, 
would cease as the blacks again accepted their social and political 
inferiority and abstained from attacks on white women. Since Till­
man believed that lynching for deeds other than rape rarely occurred, 
in 1916 he predicted that lynch law would then virtually disappear in 
the South.18 
Having examined Tillman's philosophy of lynching, the question 
remains of how consistent he was in putting these beliefs into prac­
tice as both a private citizen and a chief executive of South Carolina. 
Ben Tillman's first connection with lynching came during the 
racial disturbances which marred the election of 1876. A devout and 
apparently sincere believer in the inherent inferiority of black peo­
ple, Tillman regarded the limited participation by blacks in govern­
ment during Reconstruction as the worst possible form of tyranny. 
As a member of the Edgefield Sweetwater Sabre Club, he played an 
active role in several racial incidents. As he later reminisced, he did 
not actually kill any blacks although he claimed to have made one 
attempt during the course of the so-called Hamburg Riot. He did at 
that time, moreover, aid the men who lynched six black militiamen 
by lending his gun to one of them.19 Far from feeling shame for his 
actions, Tillman boasted of them in numerous speeches and public lec­
tures stressing that he had only done his patriotic duty in helping 
to re-establish white supremacy in South Carolina.20 
With the cooling of political and racial passions after the inau­
guration of Wade Hampton as governor, Tillman returned to a rela­
tively uneventful farm life. Aroused by the economic problems which 
plagued South Carolina farmers during the 1870's and 1880's, he 
17Senator Tillman, January 12, 1907, Congressional Record, LI, 1444; Un­
identified newspaper clipping, Scrapbook 11 (1906-07) in Tillman Papers. 
18B. R. Tillman to Almonico T. Gary, May 26, 1916, Ibid. 
19Benjamin Ryan Tillman, The Struggles of 1876: How South Carolina was 
Delivered from Carpet-bag and Negro Rule: Speech at the Red-Shirt-Re-union at 
Anderson, N.p., 1909, pp. 14 and 24. 
20Columbia State, July 3, 1895; U. S. Congress, Senate, Senator Tillman 
speaking on the race question, 56th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 1900, Congressional 
Record, XXXIII, 3223-24; 57th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 1902, Congressional Record, 
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emerged to lead the frustrated farm element in a revolt against eco­
nomic exploitation by the Conservative regime. Insisting that the 
gubernatorial canvass of 1890 must center upon the state's economic 
problems, Tillman denounced his Conservative opponents, Joseph 
Earle and John Bratton, for interjecting national issues. Breaking 
away from the tradition of underscoring the Republican oppression 
of the state, he even dismissed Bratton's emphasis on the possibility 
of a new federal "force bill" as an attempt to "bamboozle the voters" 
into blaming Washington for their troubles.21 
In down-playing the racial issue, Tillman repeatedly stressed 
that he bore no ill feeling towards black people and declared that he 
would "be governor of the whole people, regardless of color," and 
would "do justice to all."22 Statements of this type won the support 
of the black farmers' alliances although he did not actually court the 
black vote.23 In fact, of the gubernatorial contenders, only Alexander 
Haskell, who headed the Independent ticket opposing Tillman in the 
general election, made a direct appeal for black support.24 
With race serving as a strictly secondary issue in the campaign, 
Tillman easily perpetuated the Conservative tradition of denouncing 
lynching. Since Haskell's racial policy tempted only blacks and a very 
few whites, there was no reason for Tillman to play upon racial preju­
dice, for his moderate racial stand would draw support from both 
moderate whites and Negrophobes. He could well afford to concen­
trate upon his economic program which attracted farmers of both 
races. 
Shortly before beginning his campaign, Tillman had even 
emerged as an opponent of lynch law. As the foreman of an Edgefield 
County grand jury in May, 1890, he severely castigated Governor 
John Peter Richardson for negligence in the lynching of Willie Leap-
hart in Lexington County. Later, as a gubernatorial candidate, he 
pledged that he would permit no such lynchings if he were elected. 
By capitalizing on the reaction against the lynching of an innocent 
man, Tillman gained additional backing.25 
He reaffirmed this antilynching sentiment in his inaugural ad­
2iWilliam James Cooper, Jr., The Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 
1877-1890, Baltimore, 1968, p. 171. 
22Unidentified clipping, Scrapbook 2 (1885-92) in Tillman Papers. 
23Undated clipping, Charleston News and Courier, Scrapbook 4 (1890) in 
Tillman Papers. 
2*Cooper, The Conservative Regime, p. 202. 
25Columbia State, April 25, 1893. 
BEN TILLMAN—No APOLOGIES FOR LYNCHING 11 
dress emphasizing that lynching was a blot on the civilization of the 
state and deploring the fact that blacks had usually been the victims 
of lynch mobs. Since the machinery of justice was controlled by 
whites, there was no need to resort to lynching merely because people 
had tired of the inefficient administration of the law. Tillman pro­
posed revamping the court rules to eliminate "new trials granted 
upon technicalities" and as a "desperate remedy" empowering the 
governor to remove from office any sheriff who failed to protect 
prisoners from mob violence.26 
Tillman's approach to lynchings during the early half of his 
first administration appears consistent with the position taken at 
his inauguration. In his message to the legislature in early December, 
1891, he boasted that no lynchings had occurred because he had called 
out the militia twice to forestall possible lynchings.27 Later in that 
month, the first lynching of his administration occurred. When noti­
fied of the probability of the lynching of accused murderer, Dick 
Lundy, he promptly ordered the militia to protect the prisoner. After 
his wholehearted efforts had proved unsuccessful, he reiterated his 
request for authority to remove negligent sheriffs claiming that with­
out this power, he was impotent against mob demands.28 
In February, 1892, however, as his re-election campaign drew 
near Tillman cast doubt upon the sincerity of his antilynching views 
by appointing Calhoun Caughman, who had led the mob that lynched 
Leaphart, to the position of executor of the fish laws in Georgetown. 
He even proclaimed that there was "no blot or smirch" on Caugh-
man's record.29 
In the absence of conclusive evidence, this writer assumes that 
the political situation was probably the key factor in the reversion 
of Tillman to his original position. Although Tillman himself was 
immensely popular, the still predominantly conservative legislature 
had blocked much of his economic program. He determined that the 
election would not only return him to the governorship but would also 
replace this legislative "driftwood" with a group favorable to his 
26Benjamin Ryan Tillman, "Inaugural Aldress of B. R. Tillman Governor of 
South Carolina, delivered at Columbia, S. C., December 4, 1890," pp. 5-6. 
27B. R. Tillman, "Message of B. R. Tillman, Governor to the General Assem­
bly of the State of South Carolina, Regular Session, 1891," pp. 28-29. 
28South Carolina, Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the State 
of South Carolina, Being the Regular Session Commencing November 2U, 1891, 
p. 228; Charleston News and Courier, Dec. 11, 1891; Columbia State, December 8, 
10, 15, 1891. 
29Columbia State, April 25, 1893. 
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program. To effect his massive plan, he was willing to play upon 
racial as well as economic tensions.30 Tillman's decision to capitalize 
on the Negrophobic and pro-lynching views of many of his white 
constituents also gave him the opportunity to voice his own private 
beliefs in the inherent inferiority of blacks and in the necessity of 
lynching for rape. 
Despite this apparent decision, erratic behavior towards lynch­
ing characterized his campaign. On the one hand, he repeatedly testi­
fied that he as governor would lead a mob "to lynch a negro that 
would ravish a white woman. "I do justify lynching for rape," he 
continued, "and before Almighty God, I am not ashamed of it."31 In 
these same speeches, however, he still urged that the governor be 
empowered to remove sheriffs who allowed prisoners to be lynched.32 
He also denounced lynch law as one of the "principal causes why 
capital was afraid to come into South Carolina."33 
A statistical study of the rate of industrial growth in South Caro­
lina during the 1890's signifies that there is some validity to Tillman's 
charge that lynching was discouraging investment in the state. Census 
records reveal that the number of industries in counties where lynch-
ings did not materialize increased by 9% between 1890 and 1900 over 
the counties where lynchings occurred.34 Industrially backward 
counties tended to encourage lynching because their educational and 
per capita wealth levels remained low; and as Arthur Raper notes, 
lynching rates are higher in counties where cultural and economic 
institutions are unstable and officers of the law are far apart, poorly 
paid, and dependent upon local sentiment.35 
Surely, Tillman recognized the strong correlation between lynch­
ing and non-industrialized areas. Since he as governor was respon­
sible for bringing industry into the state, he had to eradicate or at 
least curb lynching and its accompanying destruction of property 
before he could effectively portray South Carolina as a desirable place 
for investment. Thus while the difference in the rate of industrializa­
30Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, p. 196. 
189231^°^Um^a *^une 1892, Charleston News and Courier, July 7, 11, 
32Columbia State, June 8, 1892. 
33Charleston News and Courier, July 11, 1892. 
.L34UE;JS•, DePartment of the Interior, Bureau of'the Census, The United States 
at the Eleventh Census, 1890: Report on Manufacturing Industries, II, 586 and 
Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900: Manufactures, VIII 832. 
35Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching, Chapel Hill, 1933, p. 1. 
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tion is not a conclusive reason for Tillman's denunciation of lynching, 
it is a very plausible motive. 
Throughout the remainder of his gubernatorial career, Tillman 
continued to display the same inconsistent behavior regarding lynch­
ing. For example, when the news of the unexpected lynching of Dave 
Shaw for larceny in June, 1892, reached Tillman, he seemed staggered 
by the event and offered a reward of $500 for the apprehension and 
conviction of each of the lynchers, but limited the total reward to 
$2000 although evidence indicated that at least fifteen or twenty 
men had actively participated in the killing.36 
Another interesting incident occurred in July, 1892, when the 
angered husband of a white woman assaulted by a black man near 
Irmo asked Tillman to head a lynching party. Instead of fulfilling his 
promises to lead such a mob, he called out the militia to safeguard the 
accused and talked of convening a special session of court to try him.37 
The question of why Tillman did not respond as he had pledged can­
not be conclusively answered. Most probably, he thought that the 
active participation of the governor in a lynch mob would damage the 
state's reputation irreparably and would discourage further industrial 
development. The Columbia State suggested as a possible explanation 
that Tillman made his sensational promises in order to cement sup­
port among his Negrophobic constituents without ever intending to 
abide by his assertions.38 His other anti-lynching actions included 
calling out the militia to prevent at least four lynchings in 1893— 
two involving accused murderers and two accused rapists.39 He also 
offered rewards for the capture and conviction of the men who par­
ticipated in three lynchings while he was in New York in June, 1894.40 
On other occasions, there was nothing commendable in Tillman's 
behavior. Sometimes he ignored sheriffs' pleas for help in preventing 
threatened lynchings,41 and once he virtually connived with a lynch­
ing party. This last episode occurred in April, 1893, when he disre­
garded John Peterson's request for protection against Denmark citi­
zens enraged over the rape of a white woman. Tillman sent Peterson 
36Columbia State, June 5, 6, 1892. 
37/6td., July 29, 1892, Aug. 2, 1892. 
wibid., Aug. 2, 1892. 
39/6id., April 23, 26, 1893; and September 28, 1893; Charleston News and 
Courier, October 2, 1893. 
40Columbia State, June 9, 1894. 
41Ibid., January 29, 1893, April 26, 1893; Charleston News and Courier, 
October 2, 1893; D. J. Bradham to B. R. Tillman, July 15, 1894 in Tillman Papers. 
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with only one guard to the town to face a mob determined to lynch 
someone for the crime. After the lynching, Tillman disclaimed any 
blame for it claiming that he felt that Peterson would have escaped 
harm had he been innocent. Although he authorized an investigation 
of the event, he offered no reward for the capture of,the lynchers. 
He evidently felt no shame or guilt over the loss of a human life— 
especially one whose culpability was doubtful. Instead he averred 
that if the Columbians who condemned the lynching at Denmark so 
strongly realized "the lonely roads over which the women of the 
country have to pass," then they would understand "the feeling of 
the men of Barnwell County which made them lynch that negro."42 
Tillman's last opportunity to have a direct impact upon lynch­
ing in South Carolina came during the state constitutional convention 
of 1895. In proposing various measures for the curbing of lynch law, 
he declared that the delegates were dealing with a "desperate case" 
and must act accordingly. He successfully worked for the adoption 
of a resolution giving the governor authority to remove sheriffs who 
neglected to protect their prisoners from mob violence. He also ob­
tained a provision making counties in which lynchings occurred liable 
for damages up to $2000. Despite his efforts to secure the adoption 
of these measures, he recognized that few verdicts would be brought 
against lynchers because passions would prevent most jurors from 
convicting fellow townsmen who participated in lynchings.43 
From this mass of seemingly contradictory statements and ac­
tions, several conclusions are apparent to this writer. First, feeling 
that his political fortunes at times necessitated compromising his 
fundamental belief in the need of lynching for rape, Tillman at­
tempted to keep his actions in tune with the most prevalent views in 
South Carolina. His opposition to lynch law during the campaign of 
1890 and his support of it in 1876 and 1892 generally illustrate this 
point. Although he privately and sometimes publically sanctioned the 
lynching of rapists, he recognized that lynchings contributed to the 
impression of lawlessness and thus discouraged possible capital in­
vestment in the state. Therefore, in order to court potential investors, 
42Columbia State, May 3, 1893. 
xt 4^°H*o1r>i~'ar0l*na' Constitution, art. 6, sec. 6; Charleston News and Courier, 
,?7'.?• °» 1.8^' p< * ?nc* Nov- 13, 1895, p. 4; South Carolina, Journal of the Con­
stitutional Convention of the State of South Carolina Begun to he Holden at 
Columbia, S. C., on Tuesday the Tenth Day of September, Anno Domini, Eighteen 
Hundred and Ninety-five and Continued with Divers Adjournments until Wednes­
day, the r ourth Day of December, Anno Domini, Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-
five, When Finally Adjourned, pp. 123, 417, 513, 529 and 656-57. 
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he had to condemn lynch law and take positive measures against it. 
On the other hand, his repeated references to the inadequacy of 
the South Carolina courts and law enforcement indicates that Till­
man, despite his firm belief in state rights, did not trust South Caro­
linians to establish and maintain an efficient and fair judicial system. 
In the absence of conclusive evidence, the question of why Tillman 
manifested an inferiority complex concerning his state's legal institu­
tions cannot be definitively answered at present. Possible explana­
tions include a distrust in the effacy of all legal administration of 
justice or doubt as to the ability of white South Carolinians to formu­
late an impartial, workable judicial machinery. 
The conflict between his own views, his gubernatorial responsi­
bilities, and his political ambitions resulted in inconsistent actions 
and pronouncements. However, once in the Senate outside the main 
current of South Carolina politics, Tillman felt safe in presenting his 
philosophy of lynching in public addresses. After the constitutional 
convention of 1895, he never deviated from this theme: 'T have al­
ways advocated lynching for rape everywhere and under all cir­
cumstances."44 
^B. R. Tillman to the editor of the New York Swi, November 4, 1913 in 
Tillman Papers. 
"COTTON ED" SMITH'S RESPONSE TO 
ECONOMIC ADVERSITY 
SELDEN K . SMITH 
The economic boom generated by World War I brought to the 
South a taste of affluence unknown since 1860. In South Carolina, 
the value of all farm crops had more than tripled in the decade from 
1909 to 1918. But the brief era of prosperity ended with the dramatic 
break in commodity prices in 1920.1 One writer compared the South's 
reversal in fortune to a weekend of "economic debauchery" inevitably 
followed by a "gloomy Monday."2 As conditions worsened, gloom 
turned to anger and bitterness. 
The economic adversity of 1920 was real. The average cotton 
price received by farmers in 1919 was 35.6 cents per pound; in 1920 
only 14 cents. Cottonseed brought $67 a ton in 1919 but averaged only 
$22 in 1920. The decline in the tobacco market was similar. Yields in 
South Carolina per acre were down to 650 pounds compared to the 
average of 730 in 1914 and 722 in 1919. The 1920 price per pound 
was only 15 cents compared to a wartime high of over 31 cents in 
1918. And the year end averages partially obscured the severity of 
the crisis. The South Carolina farmers received 87 per cent of their 
annual receipts from commodities between September of 1920 and 
January of 1921.3 
Disparity between expenditures and receipts compounded the 
economic squeeze. Overalls which sold for 82 cents in 1909 had risen 
to $2.63; flannel shirts had tripled in price. A barrel of flour doubled 
in price between 1909 and 1920 while suger prices were tripling. The 
1920 crop was particularly expensive. Wages had risen more than 
240 per cent above the 1909-1913 average. With board furnished, a 
male received about $30.50 a month for farm work in 1920 compared 
to $12 in 1910. Commercial fertilizers, mules, nails and plows had 
doubled in price during the same period.4 
Low prices with high production costs were always intolerable, 
but mother nature made 1920 even more difficult. A late winter and 
iYearbook of Agriculture, 1918, Washington, 1919, p. 670. 
2Quoted in George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-
1945, Vol. X of A History of the South, Baton Rouge, 1967, p. 56. 
3Yearbook of Agriculture, 1920, pp. 647, 803-04, 813. 
*Ibid., pp. 725, 808-25. 
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torrential rains delayed cotton planting and seeds rotted in the 
ground. Cold nights and frost in the spring took their toll of young 
plants. Forty per cent of the cotton crop had to be replanted. In con­
sequence of weather conditions on this late crop, boll weevil infesta­
tion was very high.5 
The national economy was in a period of readjustment jolted by 
the dramatic reduction in federal expenditures following the war. 
The pre-war sixty-fourth Congress (1915-1917) had appropriated 
$3,500,000,000; the sixty-fifth and the first session of the sixty-sixth 
Congresses (1917-1919), known as the "war congresses," had pro­
vided a whopping $43,400,000,000,® but the economy-minded second 
session of the sixty-sixth Congress (1919-1920) had slashed appro­
priations to only $4,700,000,01)0. Retrenchment meant to the farmers 
cutbacks in crop reporting services, disease control, research, and 
the assistance of the agricultural experiment stations. Even funds for 
the politically popular distribution of free seeds were pared by two-
thirds.7 Foreign demand for agricultural products declined and do­
mestic unemployment rose to over ten per cent of the work force by 
1921.8 With all these negative factors converging, nineteen-twenty 
was indeed a bad year. 
The farmers of the South were outraged and they let the country 
know about it. In October 1920 reports of "night riders" were fre­
quent in Texas, Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Caro-
linas. After several cotton gins and warehouses were burned, opera­
tors resorted to the use of armed guards. Threatening notes were 
posted by irate farmers on ginhouses; sometimes a box of matches 
was found next to a warning not to open the facility until cotton was 
40 cents a pound. Cotton remained unpicked in many posted fields. 
Reports from Atlanta indicated that many black pickers feared the 
Klan and therefore refused to enter the fields. Guards were hired 
and alarmed insurance companies cancelled policies. In South Caro­
lina, Governor R. A. Cooper promised the full cooperation of his 
office with the problem and the prosecution of "night riders," re­
ported in Anderson, Oconee, and three other counties.9 
5New York Times June 3, 1920. Boll weevil infestation was first identified 
in South Carolina in 1917. 
6Ibid., March 5, 1931. 
ilbid., May 28, 1920. 
8George Soule, Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917-1929, 
New York, 1947, p. 96. 
9New York Times, October 9, 1920; October 11, 1920; October 15, 1920. 
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What response to the agricultural crisis of 1920 could be ex­
pected from the senior senator from South Carolina, Ellison Durant 
Smith? A few clues to the answer to this query are revealed in the 
senator's background. 
Born on a substantial family farm in Lee County in 1864, the 
young Smith spent his childhood in neither poverty nor wealth. He 
attended schools in Lynchburg and Charleston before matriculating 
at South Carolina College in 1885. After a poor year he was "obliged 
to rusticate at Wofford" where he did well in debate, science, litera­
ture, and oratory and received the A.B. degree in 1889.10 In the 1890's 
Smith was a planter interested in politics, public schools, prohibition, 
and private colleges. As a member of the South Carolina House of 
Representatives, 1897-1900, Smith was generally considered anti-
Tillman because of his attacks on the dispensary and the public 
colleges. 
As an unsuccessful candidate for the United States House of 
Representatives in 1901, Smith had favored the Nicaraguan Canal, 
rural free delivery, and federal support of roads, swamp drainage, 
and irrigation but opposed ship subsidies, imperialism, trusts, and 
the tariff. At one stump meeting he stated that the big issue was "the 
question between capital and labor" and he was on labor's side.11 As 
an active participant and organizer in farmer organizations in South 
Carolina and throughout the Southeast from the late 1890's until 
1907, Smith had attacked the cotton exchanges and had urged coop­
erative ventures in crop reduction, warehousing, and direct sales to 
textile mills.12 His activities with these organizations earned him the 
nicknames "Gatlin Gun," "Carolina Smith," and "Cotton Ed."13 
Elected to the United States Senate in 1908, Smith served con­
tinuously until his death in 1944. Despite the accuracy of the news­
paper commentary after his maiden speech in the Senate—"His mid-
10John A. Rice, / Came Out of the Eighteenth Century, New York, 1942, 
p. 70; Congressional Directory 61st Cong., 2nd sess., p. 115; Martha Nelle 
Bouknight, "The Senatorial Campaigns of Ellison Durant ('Cotton Ed') Smith 
of South Carolina," unpublished Master's thesis, Florida State University, 1961, 
pp. 5-6. 
n Sumter Herald, August 16, 1901; August 23, 1901; August 30, 1901; Sep­
tember 6, 1901. 
i2Selden K. Smith, "Ellison Durant Smith: A Southern Progressive, 1909-
1929," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1970, pp. 
28-37. 
i3"Gatlin Gun" and "Carolina Smith" were two early nicknames, but it 
was the third, "Cotton Ed," coined by a New Orleans newspaper, that was to 
stick with Smith the rest of his life. He loved it. New York Times, November 
18, 1944. 
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dL name is Durant, and that's what he do"14—the senator's voting 
record indicated consistent support for most of the legislative pro­
gram of the national progressives. When downward revision of the 
tariff was not possible, he endorsed reciprocity as a step in the right 
direction. He supported national banking and credit reforms, federal 
aid for agriculture and road construction, and federal regulation 
through the Clayton Anti-trust Act, the federal trade commission, 
and the Adamson Act. Smith seconded Wilson's nomination in 1912 
and generally supported the Democratic President except on the issue 
of immigration. He introduced the Muscle Shoals legislation for the 
construction of nitrate plants and supported the government take­
over of the railroads and telegraph lines during World War I. He 
helped obtain Chilean nitrates for farmers with government aid and 
successfully opposed wartime price controls for cotton. 
Smith's credentials as a progressive were valid but incomplete. 
He gave little attention to matters of social conscience such as un­
employment, slums, and discrimination. The humanitarian urge which 
made "do-gooders" of many progressives was not in evidence. He 
opposed child labor legislation, praising the millowners while argu­
ing that the workers did not want the legislation. He protested woman 
suffrage and tarbrushed the nineteenth amendment with talk of the 
"alien population amongst us." The women of South Carolina did not 
favor it, he said, for they, in his words, "refused to be stampeded by 
a few hysterical propagandists or propagooses." Showing no social or 
economic concern for the unhappy lot of black Americans, Smith ac­
cepted the assumptions of racial prejudice which permeated his 
society.15 However, of all the issues which confronted this politician, 
none was dearer than the problems of agriculture. 
As the commodity prices dropped in the fall of 1 920, the farmers 
and their elected representatives began to apply pressure in Wash­
ington. Because the President was ill this farm lobby met with the 
cabinet and arranged a meeting with the Federal Reserve Board as 
well. "Cotton Ed" forewarned the board at a public meeting the day 
before their appointment. He called for an economic boycott of ag­
ricultural commodities throughout the nation to force the federal re­
serve to relax its credit policies. "Let us say to the Federal Board 
that 40 cent cotton and $3.00 wheat are our prices and if we don't 
14Beverly Smith, "F.D.R., Here I Come," American Magazine, January, 
1939, p. 146. 
15Smith, "Ellison Durant Smith," pp. 279-81. 
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get them we will try to get those in office who will loosen up. . . ,"16 
Encouraged by shouts of approval at this October 12 meeting, 
Smith struck hard at the speculators and government bankers. "If 
forty cent cotton and three dollar wheat are speculative, who says 
so ... . the man who sweats in the field or the man who sits down at 
home and manipulates them? Who in America has been given the 
power to fix the price of anything? I am tired of running around ask­
ing appointed creatures to interpret the Federal Reserve law for 
me."17 The senator felt that the board should simply discount the 
farmers' paper, pass on the paper's eligibility, and not concern itself 
with prices. 
Smith had no patience with those who urged caution. "So far as 
some people coming here and saying 'the Government will frown on 
that'—for God's sakes! haven't we got a government and isn't that 
government the democracy of the people themselves?" After listen­
ing to "Cotton Ed" and another speaker who described the federal 
reserve as an "octopus bent on robbing the people," a man from Cave 
Springs, Georgia exclaimed, "My God! Night riders in Georgia and 
day riders in Washington !"18 
At a farmers conference with treasury secretary David F. Hous­
ton on October 14, Smith suggested the revival of the war finance 
corporation in order to provide cotton credits to Austria and Germany. 
That wartime agency had the authority to advance up to $1,000,-
000,000 until one year after the end of hostilities as proclaimed by 
the President. In response to the senator, Houston said, "Then you 
would lend money to Germany." Smith was unequivocal, "Yes, I 
would because you know that Germany must live and we must not 
starve." 
Following the interruption for applause, Smith began to plead 
with Houston, the former secretary of agriculture: 
You, Mr. Secretary, are the only one who can speak the 
words to liberate us. . . . God help you if you don't do it. We 
face ruin and it's monstrous and an official crime not to stop 
it. Talk of where we would get the money! Where did we get 
the $26,000,000,000 used to whip Germany to her knees? If 
!6New York Times, October 13, 1920. 
nibid. 
is Ibid. 
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necessary, I would bond the country again as we did in the 
Victory and Liberty loans.19 
J. S. Wannamaker of St. Matthews, president of the American 
Cotton Association, wanted the Congress to create a $1,000,000,000 
revolving fund to aid producers and consumers in handling the com­
modities. In anger and sadness he cried, "God pity a nation that won't 
lend money to its people to aid agriculture."20 The National Farmers' 
Council joined with a number of Southern bankers and cotton mer­
chants and demanded that the reserve board lower its rediscount rate 
and set aside its regulations defining rediscountable agricultural 
paper. "Cotton Ed" lent his support to this proposition and stated 
that Congress could catch up with the necessary legislative authori­
zation at the next session. At his meeting with the reserve board the 
senator had urged similar action, frankly admitting that the farmers 
were a special class who merited preferential treatment.21 
The response from the administration and the federal reserve 
board gave the farmers no hope of aid. Although buffeted by severe 
criticism even within the cabinet, Houston clung to his belief that 
time alone and the natural forces that governed the marketplace 
would cure the crisis. The war finance board was not revived despite 
the pleas of the farmers and the recommendation of Eugene Meyer, 
Jr., the former president of that public corporation. Wilson appar­
ently agreed with Houston. At a cabinet meeting during the crisis 
Wilson shut off debate on the subject with, "Let's talk about some­
thing more interesting. It is no use trying to reason with people into 
whose minds reason never entered."22 
Houston was convinced that much of the public rhetoric was 
Southern political sham. In his memoirs, the secretary described a 
meeting with a delegation from the South concerning the cotton crisis 
of 1920. As he related the events, just prior to his meeting with the 
Southern group, several senators came into his office by another door 
and "told me . . . that they knew I could not do what the delegation 
was going to urge but that they had to appear to be sympathetic" 
19/6td., October 15, 1920. 
201 bid. 
21/6td., October 13, 1920; October 15, 1920; October 16, 1920. 
22David F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920, New 
York, 1926, II, 108-115. 
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and they expressed the hope that Houston would understand. The 
secretary understood but was not the least bit sympathetic.23 
On October 16 the federal reserve board answered the farmers, 
denied any past contraction of credit and promised no expansion and 
ignored the demand that rediscount rates be lowered. The board acted 
on the assumption that the price decline in commodities was just an 
"unavoidable consequence" of the end of the great war.24 The follow­
ing week the American Bankers' Association meeting in Washington 
gave wholehearted endorsement to the administration and the federal 
reserve board. The president of the Atlanta National Bank declared 
that the time had passed for oratory and appeals to the government. 
Private bankers and farmers had to help themselves and do the job 
required and that task was not to hold cotton but to move cotton. The 
bankers had no intention of helping the farmer corner the market 
in commodities.25 
In an article in the New York Times which appeared under his 
own by-line in late October, Cotton Ed" discussed the farm crisis. A 
farm strike was inevitable if relief was not granted. The strike as 
defined by Smith was simply a mass movement of farmers leaving the 
land, all agricultural activity would not cease but disastrous cuts in 
production would occur. Some would continue to plant, clinging to 
the hope of better days; "a few others will keep on in a dull listless 
sort of fashion, through sheer force of habit until they go down under 
the loss. The senator felt that few people fully comprehended the 
impact of this mass migration to the city. The farmer, like those in 
other endeavors, was beset by the high cost of living, not the cost of 
high living. The situation demanded not a greater supply of money 
but a better distribution of money to benefit the average man. It 
had been "fondly thought that the Federal Reserve Board would 
normally and effectually bring about this distribution. . . ." If the 
28Ibid,., p p. 103-105. On October 23, 1920, Houston complained to W. W. Ball 
o he ignorance and insolence of such crazy people as Wannamaker and such 
demagogues as E. D. Smith in the South, and such absolutely benighted and 
backward minds as Harding and the group of reactionaries who control him." 
ouston was convinced that Wannamaker and Smith were unrepresentative of 
the great mass of Southern people and he likewise rejected their proposals for 
Houston s low opinion of the senator was revealed in the same letter. 
Of course I have known E. D. Smith for 35 years. I knew him in college 
[South Carolina College] as you did. I regarded him as a boob then, and he has 
lost ground in 35 years." D F Houston to W. W. Ball, October 23, 1920, Duke 
University Library, W. W. Ball Papers. 
24New York Times, October 17, 1920 
25Ibid.., October 20, 1920; October 21, 1920; October 22, 1920. 
"COTTON ED" SMITH'S RESPONSE TO ECO NOMIC AD VERSITY 23 
nation was to avoid "serious trouble," the federal reserve system or 
"some other agency" must effect a more equitable distribution. 
The senator made clear in his article that the farmers who gath­
ered in Washington and talked of reducing acreage by one-half or 
one-third were "desperate" men. "Cotton Ed" left no doubt as to the 
source from which farm relief was expected. "To whom would they 
naturally turn ? The answer is to their government. The manufacturer 
has back of him powerful financial affiliations. The farmer has only 
himself and his government."26 
Throughout the depressing episode of the farm crisis of 1920, 
Senator Smith's behavior was quite consistent with his earlier per­
formance. He was an active propagandist, sensitive to the economic 
problems of those he represented, but he did not command the forces 
required to effect relief. In spite of his outbursts of radicalism, Smith 
struck no terror in conservative hearts. He was capable of rising to 
rhetorical heights in his expression of sympathy for the white 
masses.27 His threats were indulged or cast asides as the exaggera­
tions of a politician who would not or could not deliver. Although 
ineffective in the 1920 crisis, the issues he recognized were basic to 
the American farm problem—special credits, foreign markets, crop 
reduction, and federal assistance. For the politician who had helped 
fashion the paternalistic state for agriculture, it was logical to turn 
to that institution in time of crisis. Disappointment came when that 
government proved unresponsive to genuine need. The senator clung 
to no doctrinaire positions of states rights or laissez faire economics. 
His response to the depression of 1920 was that of a demagogic poli­
tician motivated by practical politics. 
2SIbid., October 24, 1920. 
?7An example of this rhetoric was delivered in 1913 during debate over 
cotton futures legislation: "We sit here in better circumstances and do not hear 
the cry of poverty nor feel the humility of its attendant evils. We are optimistic, 
and we are forgetful of our more unfortunate fellows. These are the lines that 
illustrate that: 
The toad beneath the harrow knows 
Exactly where each tooth point goes. 
The butterfly upon the road 
Preaches contentment to that toad." 
Congressional Record, 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 4001 (February 26, 1913). Smith must 
have liked the verse. During the Muscle Shoals debates in 1926 he repeated it 
for Senator Heflin's benefit and added, "But the toad is getting darned tired of 
the butterfly preaching contentment to him. (Laughter)" Congressional Record, 
69 Cong., 1 Sess., 4837 (March 2, 1926). 
EXECUTIVE POWERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS: 
THE NEUTRALITY ACTS REVISITED 
JAMIE W . MOORE 
Almost uniformly, and incorrectly I believe, studies of America's 
diplomatic activities during the mid-1930's place their strongest em­
phasis upon the domestic bases of foreign policy.1 To be sure, the 
problem of ending the greatest depression in the nation's history com­
manded the attention of the nation's leaders. The American people 
looked back upon the horrors of a great war—already named World 
War I—and at the insoluble postwar conflicts which denied to them 
the peaceful and stable world they had been promised, and they re­
acted by showing apathy and indifference to foreign affairs and 
opposition to overseas political entanglements. No longer interested 
in crusades to make the world safe for democracy, Americans were 
more than willing to settle down in a world safe enough for the United 
States. But the case has been overstated. During these depression 
years Congress enacted and twice modified a neutrality law inter­
preted then and later as placing limits upon the President's authority. 
Upon this premise of curtailed powers is erected the thesis that the 
popular commitment to isolation and neutrality directed an unwilling 
administration to accept policies totally unsuitable for meeting the 
challenges of aggressor states. The neutrality acts affected the course 
of American foreign relations, but not in the obstructive manner so 
often described. Instead, this legislation fell well within the consensus 
of administration thinking; Franklin D. Roosevelt did not just accept 
the statutes, he embraced them. The public demands and Congres­
sional pressures for action served mainly to turn consensus into con­
viction. 
The agreement upon policy stemmed from the views of a Presi­
dent interested and actively engaged in foreign affairs and rested 
*Not unnaturally, but for far too long, the analysis of American foreign 
policy from 1933 onward has been entrusted to historians interested in exploring 
the origins of the Second World War and America's involvement in it. Whether 
explaining, castigating, or defending what happened, the authors consistently 
frame the problem in terms of the 1939-1941 struggle between isolationists and 
interventionists. To the resulting distortion caused by the historian's perspective 
must be added a general willingness to accept as fact what appears obvious on 
the surface, that the conduct of foreign affairs was a sideshow to the New Deal's 
main event of domestic reform. For three exceptions, two area studies and one 
work contemporary with the first administration, which describe foreign policy 
in terms of a response to international conditions, see Dorothy Borg, The United 
States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, Cambridge 1964; Bryce Wood, 
The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, New York 1961; and Ernest K. Lindley, 
Half Way With Roosevelt New York 1936. 
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upon the recommendations of advisors who shared and concurred in 
his decisions. The suggestion that during his first term Roosevelt 
neglected foreign policy out of his concern or preoccupation with the 
domestic economic crisis is without adequate foundation. Roosevelt 
had strong convictions, obtained good advice from many sources, used 
it in reaching his conclusions, and saw his policies translated into 
action, although he seldom proceeded rapidly or decisively and hated 
to resolve conflicts.2 Except for the frequently expressed generalized 
2For examples illustrating Roosevelt's penchant for becoming involved in 
foreign affairs, including his use of private channels of communication and 
devices for control, see Edgar M. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign 
Affairs, 3 Vols., Cambridge 1969, I, 49, 187-88, 264-66, 273-79, II, 454-55, III, 6; 
Roosevelt to S.T.E. [Stephen T. Early), Sept. 20, 1934; William E. Dodd to 
Roosevelt, July 30 1933, Roosevelt MSS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (cited 
hereafter FDRL), OF 523 (Official Files): Dodd; Robert Bingham to Roosevelt, 
Nov. 4, 1934, May 26, 1935, Roosevelt MSS, PPF 716 (President's Personal 
Files); Roosevelt to Jessie I. Straus, May 9, 1935, Roosevelt MSS, PSF (Presi­
dent's Secretary's Files): Straus; Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, April 23, 1935, Hull 
MSS, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (cited hereafter LC), box 51; 
Elliott Roosevelt, Ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters 1928-1945, New York, 1950, 
I, 508. The question of who gave Roosevelt advice is easily answered, everybody 
did. Finding out who he listened to at ^ny one time can turn into an exercise in 
futility, but for his early years the comments of the Head of the State Depart­
ment's Far Eastern Division, Stanley K. Hornbeck, hold up. According to Horn-
beck," [W|hen he [Roosevelt) wanted real facts and well considered opinions^ he 
leaned heavily upon Hull and the staff work upon which Hull in turn relied." It 
was true "that there was administrative confusion all the way from 1933 to 
1944, but the confusion during that decade was far less than that which subse­
quently prevailed for several years." Hornbeck to George E. Sokolsky, Feb. 16, 
1962 Hornbeck MSS, Hoover Institute of War, Revolution, and Peace, Archives, 
box 124. Among the President's convictions were an almost populist distrust of 
international bankers and a distaste for entering into contractural alliances with 
other governments. Roosevelt to Col. Edward M. House, Nov. 21, 1933, House 
MSS, Sterling Library, Yale University (cited hereafter SL), Correspondence 
file; Nixon, Roosevelt, I, 268-69, 596, II, 184-85; Journal entry, Sept. 28, 1934, 
William Phillips MSS, The Houghton Library of Harvard University (cited 
hereafter HL); Moffat to Davis, July 2, 1934, Davis MSS, LC, box 12, and the 
items in Vol. Ill of Frank Freidel's work noted below. Roosevelt exhibited strong 
leanings toward idealistic and simplistic solutions to complex problems. He 
favored an easy answer of having nations sign a disarmament pact doing away 
with all weapons of war except what a soldier could carry on his back. Mild 
versions of this appeared at times in his public statements. Records of the Depart­
ment of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (cited hereafter RDS), 
500-A15A4/2537 and 500-A15A4/2600 1/3; Memorandum of April 28, 1934, 
Davis MSS, Box 9; Samuel I. Rosenman, compiler, The Public Papers and Ad­
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, New York, 1938, II, 14, 185-88, 544-49. Nations 
which refused to sign, he felt, might be c oerced by an embargo or blockade. Diary 
entry, March 18, 1935, The Diaries of Henry Morgenthau Jr., Book IV, p. 12, 
FDRL. Roosevelt spoke about how international problems might be resolved if 
national leaders could get together, discuss, and perhaps compose their differ­
ences. Roosevelt to Davis, Aug. 21, 1933, Davis MSS, box 51; Roosevelt to Dodd, 
Sept. 13, 1933 and Aug. 25, 1934, Roosevelt MSS, OF 523 and PPF 1043. The 
President's feelings toward individual nations, which he tended to stereo­
type, are noted as appropriate points in the text. The evolution and matura­
tion of Roosevelt's ideas on foreign affairs are discussed in detail in a meticulous 
and worthy biography. See Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 3 Vols., Boston, 
1952, 1954, 1956, I, 226-27, 232, 260, 288, 318-19, 335-36, II, 17-18, 52-54, 81-82, 
87, 122-37, 236, 240-41, III, 245-54, 357. 
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platitudes, the President's specific aims were never brought together 
in one single document. But the thrust of his major decisions, par­
ticularly on the basic question of collective security and the regional 
ones of European and Far Eastern relations, clearly show a reasoned 
and realistic assessment of America's role in world affairs. 
Roosevelt had an internationalist outlook, believed in coopera­
tion between nations, and expressed his sympathy toward policies 
that would condition a peaceful settlement of disputes. But he had in 
mind a particular level of American participation in any collective 
endeavor. His concern over the possibility of a major war breaking 
out led him, on several occasions, to urge European governments to 
get together and sign an agreement restricting land armaments. With­
out large quantities of modern weapons on hand, he reasoned, nations 
would have to resolve their differences peacefully. To make this sug­
gestion more palatable to those national leaders who felt signing such 
a pact would jeopardize their security, he authorized Special Ambas­
sador Norman H. Davis to state at the Geneva Disarmament Confer­
ence that in the event of a threat to world peace the United States was 
prepared to confer with other governments and, on the basis of its 
independent judgment, to refrain from taking any action which would 
tend to defeat the collective effort to restrain aggression. What Roose­
velt had approved sounded like an internationalist statement bot­
tomed on a doctrine of collective security, but it was not. His pro­
posal was contingent upon a general disarmament agreement satis­
factory to the United States being signed, and, at the time Davis 
spoke, the chances of reaching an accord no longer existed. In essence, 
Roosevelt had advanced a negative statement involving no American 
participation in collective or punitive action taken against violators 
of the peace. His declaration was a decision not to prevent other na­
tions from applying the principles of collective security, but his policy 
never involved coming to the aid of the victims of aggression.3 
3In response to an urgent request from Davis for instructions, the State 
Department established the American position on collective security which 
Roosevelt then approved. For the background see Moffat to Phillips, April 19, 
1933, Roosevelt MSS, PSF: Disarmament Conference; Conversation between Hull 
and Japanese Ambassador, May 18, 1933, Hull MSS, folder 228; RDS, 500.A15A4 
General Committee/384; U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1933, I, 154-58. (Volumes in this series are cited hereafter FRUS.) 
For the convoluted arguments which supported the announcement see Nixon, 
Roosevelt, I, 184, 190-94, 374-76, 419-22, 623-25, II, 259-61; RDS 500.A15A4/1928; 
Rosenman, Papers, III, 3-14. Roosevelt's thinking on coercing nations which did 
not sign a non-aggression pact (cited in n. 2, above) followed the same reasoning 
as the Geneva statement. American participation would be limited to seeing that 
no Americans violated the embargo or blockade. 
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In matters affecting what Roosevelt considered a vital American 
interests, however, he replaced vague generalities with positive state­
ments. In 1934, after the Japanese government had made known its 
complete dissatisfaction with the Washington and London treaties 
which denied them across the board parity in naval arms, the British 
Foreign Office invited American and Japanese representatives to 
London for a series of private discussions. The British hoped to find 
some formula which would keep Japan within the framework of an 
international agreement. If necessary, they were ready to at least 
consider compromising the 10-10-7 ratio principle. From the begin­
ning, Roosevelt denied Japan's assertion of the right to build and 
maintain a navy equal in size to the American fleet. When it seemed 
to him that the British might be thinking about a major accommoda­
tion, possibly including a revival of the old Anglo-Japanese alliance, 
the President angrily issued instructions to his delegation to take a 
firm stand. He hoped American steadfastness would convince the 
Japanese to drop their demands, but his real target was Prime Min­
ister Ramsay MacDonald whom he intended to impress with the 
simple fact that Britain had no choice but to line up with the United 
States. Roosevelt was willing to risk a rupture of Anglo-American 
friendship to get this point across.4 
4Rivalry in fleet strength had been a disturbing feature in Anglo-American 
relations after World War I. While neither government envisioned any possibility 
of a clash, the two naval establishments, each working on the "worst case theory 
of preparedness, were determined that any accommodation did not compromise 
security. See Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward A New Order of Sea Power 
Princeton, 1940, pp. 17, 19, 21-22, 37-38, 75, 123, 278-92, and Stephen Roskill, 
The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929, Vol. I, Naval Policy Be­
tween the Wars, London, 1968, pp. 20-24, 81-83, 222-23. In testimony before a 
Congressional committee in 1921 Roosevelt declared that the United States needed 
the largest navy in the world, a statement which went further than the then 
existing policy of having a navy second to none. Quoted in George T. Davis, 
A Navy Second to None, New York, 1940, p. 357, f.n. American-British differ­
ences were grudgingly resolved in the agreements reached at Washington in 
1922 and London in 1930. These treaties assumed that the Pacific naval powers 
would operate within the status quo, neither extending their ambitions nor feel­
ing their security menaced by other powers. Nevertheless, Roosevelt never really 
abandoned his principle of American security first. In 1933, when he announced 
a program of naval building, he primarily intended to aid national defense. 
Pumping federal money into projects to aid domestic recovery through providing 
employment in the shipyards, he felt, was an important, but secondary considera­
tion. See Nixon, Roosevelt, I, 370, and Davis, Navy, pp. 301-06. The clash of 
interests at the naval conferences which resulted in concluding the best possible 
arrangements, even if they didn't hold up in the 1930's, is covered from all sides 
in Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far 
East 1921-1931, New York, 1969; Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the 
Washington Conference 1921-1922, Knoxville, 1970; Raymond G. O'Connor, Peril­
ous Equilibrum, The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930, 
Lawrence, 1962. In the thirties, each government pursued its own policy of naval 
interest. Great Britain, with bases around the world and facing increases in 
naval strength by the governments of Italy, France, and Germany, wanted agree-
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The important aspects of the early Rooseveltian diplomacy cen­
tered around relations with Great Britain. On the surface, the two 
nations had everything in common. Both wanted peace, security, in­
creased trade, freedom from aggression, improvement in the position 
of their national economies, and a world which ran according to the 
tenets of international law. Neither wished for additional spheres of 
influence or overseas commitments, an arms race, or aggressive up­
sets of the world order. But strong differences of opinion divided the 
Atlantic democracies on financial, monetary and tariff matters, on 
the advisability of implementing an international arms agreement, 
ments limiting the size of ships and allowing Britain more of them. The United 
States, with two large oceans and few forward bases, wanted large ships for 
itself and a treaty which severely limited the number of vessels allowed to each 
nation. Japan wanted whatever the United States and Britain had. See Admiral 
William V. Pratt, "The Setting for the 1935 Naval Conference;" Sir Herbert W. 
Richmond, "Naval Problems of 1935, A British View;" and Admiral Kichisaburo 
Nomura, "Japan's Demand for Naval Equality," Foreign Affairs, XII (July, 
1934), 541-52; XIII (October, 1934), 45-58; XIII (January, 1935), 196-203. The 
1934 conversations, viewed as a preliminary meeting before the general naval 
conference everyone expected would take place in 1935, began with an exchange 
of correspondence between Stimson and MacDonald in 1933. The British, hoping 
to convince the United States to abandon construction of 10,000 ton cruisers 
which would upset Britain's program if the larger ships became a naval standard, 
widened the subject of the talks to include all naval matters. Records of the 
British Foreign Office, Public Records Office, London, W 82/82/98, F.O. 371/ 
18535 (cited hereafter RBFO). During the talks, conducted on an Anglo-Ameri­
can, Anglo-Japanese, and American-Japanese basis, the three governments found 
themselves hopelessly at odds. Anglo-American relations suffered when the Ameri­
can program of limiting armaments clashed with the British request for qualita­
tive and quantitative adjustments. The disagreements, as seen from the American 
side, may be traced in FRUS 1934, I, a series of items, pp. 222-286; Nixon, 
Roosevelt, II, 16-18, 18-19, 160-61, 161-62; Roosevelt MSS, PSF: London Naval 
Conf., file folder 1; Entries for March 16, April 2, May 8-9, and Oct. 19, Jay 
Pierrepont Moffat MSS, HL; Hornbeck MSS, box 129, Journal entry of June 26, 
1934, Phillips MSS. The American dislike of the British proposals quickly turned 
into distrust of British motives. Despite efforts within the American delegation 
at London to convince Washington the situation was not as bad as it appeared, 
by summer both Hull and Roosevelt had heard enough rumors to become highly 
suspicious. In early September the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in­
formed Grew that Japan intended to withdraw from the naval agreements. The 
American leadership, faced with what they read as British trend toward Japan 
and away from the United States, as reflected in Ambassador Lindsay's state­
ment that Britain was absorbed in Europe and did not want to "play ball" with 
the United States, began to issue warnings. Roosevelt pointedly mentioned that 
if Britain was even suspected of preferring Japan to the United States, in the 
interest of American security he would approach the Canadian, Australian, New 
Zealand, and South African peoples in a definite effort to make these dominions 
understand that their security was linked to the United States. See FRUS 1934, 
I, 296-97, 299-03, 303-04, 309-10; Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 250-54, 263-64; FRUS 
Japan 1931-1941, I, 253-54; Entries of July 3-4, Sept. 18, 21, 26, Oct. 3, Moffat 
MSS; Hull to Roosevelt, Sept. 18, 1934, PSF: State Dept., Phillips to Roosevelt, 
Nov. 9, 1934, PSF: London Naval Conf., Roosevelt MSS; Journal entry for Oct. 
15, Phillips MSS. The immediate tensions eased when on November 23 and 
December 4 MacDonald agreed that Britain needed the United States, wanted 
Anglo-American cooperation above all else, and was not interested in allowing 
Japan to attain parity. FRUS 1934, I, 368-74, 381-88. But Roosevelt did not feel 
that the difficulties had been overcome, and the suspicions reemerged in 1935. 
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and, most importantly, on the proper basis for Anglo-American co­
operation. Although both governments recognized the need to con­
tinue their friendship and seek areas where cooperative policies could 
be developed, each wanted to set the terms upon which the other was 
to cooperate. The British, challenged directly by Germany and un­
able alone to protect their Far Eastern interests, had the greater 
burden. To Roosevelt, it appeared the British were inclined to find 
their way out of the dilemma through policies of negotiation, which 
expended the assets of other nations, by mollification of the dictators, 
and from security guarantees obtained where ever they could find 
them. Believing the British were trying to cajol or blackmail him 
into some type of alliance to protect British interests, he reacted by 
determining to wait out the period of flirtation with potential aggres­
sors and look forward to a time when the aims of the two nations 
would be more compatible.5 
BAccording to a recent study of the fundamentals upon which the British 
government based its policy, Britain's aims were to reestablish in Europe an 
acceptable balance of power granting to each nation security from aggression 
and to create an opportunity for nations to rebuild their depression shattered 
economics. The British had concluded that the European issues of a monetary 
crisis, the depression, reparations, war debts, and disarmament, were part of an 
interlocked series, so entwined that unless a solution could he found for all, 
individual problems were insoluble. The quest for a method of ending the Euro­
pean dilemma meant that Far Eastern matters had to be given a lower priority. 
Feeling they would be among the first on the firing line in case of aggression 
in Europe, committed to an enthusiastic support of the League of Nations, in­
capable of protecting their interests in Asia, and unwilling to risk British or 
the League's prestige in any futile attempts to make Japan disgorge Manchuria, 
the government tread the thin line of negotiation policies designed to retain 
Chinese goodwill, to avoid antagonizing Japan, and to preserve American friend­
ship. But some elements in Britain, always in a minority and never influential 
in policy making, supported a real Anglo-Japanese accommodation. Christopher 
Thorne, "The Shanghai Crisis of 1932: The Basis of British Policy," American 
Historical Review, LXXV (October, 1970), 1616-39. The major problem dominat­
ing British foreign policy, said Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, lay in the 
dilemma of reconciling France's demand for security with Germany's insistence 
on equal rights. But although Britain Europe-first policy developed naturally, 
Britain could not overlook the long term challenge posed by Japan. Consequently, 
dependent upon American good will, upon Japanese good will, and upon the good 
will of China in order to maintain a presence in Asia, the British tried to play 
the role of an interested but honest broker. To be successful, Britain needed 
both independence and allies. Sir Robert Vansittert, Permanent Under Secretary 
of State, and other foreign office officials believed the United States was about 
to enter a period of isolationism and nationalism and would practice cooperation 
only to the extent of thrusting Britain forward to advance American interests. 
They recommended a British policy of realpolitik. Robert Vansittart, The Mist 
Procession, London, 1958, pp. 385-529; RBFO, F 2761/33/10, A 9235/252/45, 
A 9235/252/45, F 7818/5189/61, F 7818/5189/61, F 5189/5189/61. The British 
view of the 1934 preliminary naval conversations, now accessible but as yet 
unpublished in Documents on British Foreign Policy, may be traced in RBFO, 
W 82/82/89, W 2243/82/98, W 4399/82/98, F.O. 371/18535; A 5852/1939/45, 
A 5853/1938/45, F.O. 371/17599; A 5859/1939/45, F.O. 371/1934; A 8641/1938/ 
45; A 8705/1938/45, F.O. 371/17600; A 9264/1938/45, F.O. 17601; A 7186/1928/ 
45, F.O. 371/17599; A 9274/1938/45, F.O. 371/17601; A 6225/428/45, F.O. 371/ 
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Historians writing during and after the tragedy of the Second 
World War have described American foreign policy as being selfish, 
narrow, and short sighted, and have blamed the American people for 
being unwilling to meet their international responsibilities. But 
policy was not being made by national referendum, and, as the repre­
sentatives of the people, Roosevelt and his advisors did not consider 
it unreasonable to be wary of the motive of foreign governments. 
They noted with interest that Britain wanted an understanding or 
some commitment from the United States, yet was denying to France 
the same promises of support. American diplomats and private cor­
respondents abroad accurately identified the real threat of aggression 
in Europe, but the unwillingness of European nations, particularly 
Britain, to agree on a common policy to meet the danger reinforced 
Roosevelt's conviction there was no useful or constructive step he 
could take which would aid in securing world peace.6 
17598. In the naval talks the British intended not to upset the ratio formulas but 
to find some room within them for adjustments. Although unsuccessful in per­
suading the American government to accept this view, they did succeed in finally 
getting an understanding from the United States that Britain could fulfill its 
needs for additional small cruisers. The accommodation sought with Japan was 
never of the caliber which really threatened any American interest, as the British 
kept trying to make clear. 
6A mild Anglophobia, a belief in the efficacy of isolationism, and an extreme 
nationalism characterized some studies in the Navy and State Departments at 
this time. For examples see Claude A. Swanson to Roosevelt, Nov. 19, 1934, 
Roosevelt MSS, PSF: London Naval Conf.; RDS, 500.A15a5/40 1/2 and 500. 
A15a5/41; FRUS 1934,1, 230-32. Roosevelt's conviction as to the inadvisability 
of concluding any political agreement was strengthened by recurrent rumors 
that the British and Japanese governments were on the verge of reaching an 
understanding or actually making an alliance of some sort. Roosevelt was never 
convinced these reports were accurate, but neither did he disbelieve them. Diary 
entries of July 15 and 31, 1934, Joseph C. Grew MSS, HL; Memoranda and 
copies of dispatches, Hornbeck MSS, boxes 143 and 159; Diary entries of Aug. 
21 and 22, 1934, Moffat MSS; Journal entries of Aug. 21 and Sept. 24, 1934, 
Phillips MSS. Grew was instructed to try and ascertain the truth behind the 
rumors. After investigation, he reported they probably were manufactured as a 
trial balloon by the Japanese Foreign Minister. Conversations: 1932-1936, pp. 
116, 118, 123, 127, 136, 158, 160, Grew MSS. A British investigation, launched at 
the same time, turned up evidence the rumors had been started by a Soviet 
intelligence agency to test and see if an Anglo-Japanese entente was a possibility. 
RBFO, F 2614/376/23, F.O. 371/19357. In 1935 Roosevelt confided to Henry 
Morgenthau Jr. that the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was 
perhaps a successful^ step by Britain to secure their European interests through 
an accommodation with the Hitler government, potentially the continent's strong­
est land power. The President said this was entirely in keeping with the sus­
pected British design of securing their Far Eastern interests by reaching an 
agreement with Japan. Entry of July 10, 1935, Morgenthau Diaries, Book VIII. 
This portion of the Morgenthau Diaries, closed until June 25, 1969, was open by 
the staff at the FDRL at the request of this author. C.f. Roosevelt's suspicions 
about the aims behind the South American activities of friendly European gov­
ernments as recorded in the entry of Jan. 17, 1936, Harold L. Ickes, The First 
Thousand Days, 1933-1936, Vol. I, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, New 
York, 1954, p. 514. As in the case of the Japanese affair, British policy at the 
time of the naval agreement with Germany, while startling and upsetting, was 
EXECUTIVE POWERS AN D FOR EIGN REL ATIONS 
The only war danger facing the United States when Roosevelt 
took office, and that a remote and hypothetical possibility, concerned 
a clash with Japan. While still President-Elect, Roosevelt had en­
dorsed Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson's doctrine of non-recog­
nition of territorial gains resulting from the unlawful use of military 
force. Agreeing implicitly with Stimson that the occupation of Man­
churia might be the first step leading to a Japanese-dominated Asian 
order, probably harmful to American national interest, the President 
too denied that any legitimate basis for Japan's action existed and 
declared the principles of the Open Door to be the keystone of his 
Far Eastern policy. But all the rhetoric only thinly obscured the 
Chief Executive's private assessment that the United States had 
nothing to gain by challenging Japan. The Japanese government's un­
questioned military supremacy in the Western Pacific and announced 
militancy dictated a pragmatic American response of retrenchment, 
consolidation, and withdrawal from hazardous, speculative, and ad­
venturous positions, and to this Roosevelt gave his assent. Aware of 
Japan's dominate position in the Far East, he accepted the conclusion 
of h is State Department advisors that the United States was a Pacific, 
not an Asian power. Toward Japan, the American government acted 
passively, spoke softly, and carried no big stick. By 1934, both nations 
had come to a mutual realization that while they espoused conflicting 
doctrines, for the time being there were no points of actual con­
frontation.7 
not predicated upon any intention of giving Germany a free hand in Europe in 
return for non-interference with British policy. See RBFO, C 3943/55/18, F.O. 
371/18840. 
7The possibility of war with Japan was discussed at Roosevelt's second 
cabinet meeting. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign 
Affairs: Review," New York Times, July 6, 1969, Book Review Section. The 
evolution of the Stimson Doctrine is treated in detail in Robert H. Ferrell, 
American Diplomacy in the Great Depression, New Haven, 1957, pp. 151-193. 
Herbert Feis, 1933: Characters in Crisis, Boston, 1966, pp. 29-32, 48-61, patiently 
traces the development of liaison between the outgoing and incoming administra-
tons and treats Roosevelt's acceptance of Stimson's policy in depth. According 
to Stimson, Roosevelt thoroughly approved of the Hoover administration's for­
eign policy, said China would succeed in resisting Japan's encroachment, and felt 
the American fleet should remain on duty in Hawaii. (He sent it to the Atlantic 
for maneuvers in 1934). Diary entries of Jan. 9, 13, 17, 1933, Stimson MSS, SL. 
The administration's repeated declarations as to the need to maintain a lawful 
international order free from aggression are too numerous to mention. The early 
advice Roosevelt received was most cautionary. Roosevelt MSS, Hornbeck to 
Hull, May 3, 1933 and Phillips to Roosevelt, May 9, 1933, (both quickly forwarded 
to the White House). PSF: China 1933-1936, box 3. Dorothy Borg, Far Eastern 
Crisis, pp. 35-36, 519-27 demonstrates in detail that the determining factor in 
formulating American policy was the desire to avoid friction with Japan. Grew's 
warnings on Japan's strength, were based on fact plus acute observation. Roose­
velt MSS, Naval Intelligence Summary, Dec. 12, 1933, PSF: Navy Department; 
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Under the circumstances, the President had only limited alterna­
tives. Unwilling to either withdraw completely from the Far East or 
to make the unthinkable choice of cooperating in the Japanese effort 
to establish hegemony over China, and not inclined to confront the 
Nippon Empire aggressively, he simply followed the obvious course 
of watching, waiting, and hoping for better days ahead. The policy, 
really little more than the continuation of what Stimson had begun 
plus the old American dream that disorganized China might turn 
itself into a viable sovereign nation, was criticized by Americans who 
suggested their government take some action to improve Japanese-
American relations. A number of serious policy reviews left the ad­
ministration right back where it started. The passive containment of 
Japan, originally formulated because nothing better could be found, 
was continued for much the same reason. It maintained a vague 
moral commitment without leading the United States into dangerous 
adventures.8 
Problems summary, n.d., PSF: Japan, 1933. For Grew's comments and the 
assessments of the Far Eastern experts which reached the White House see Hull 
to Roosevelt, Nov. 1, 1934, PSF: Cordell Hull, 1933-37; FRUS 1935, III, 821-29, 
829-37, 842-43. The American low profile was much in evidence during the Amau 
affair when the Japanese Chief of Information and Intelligence, in April, 1934, 
announced Japan's Monroe Doctrine for Asia. The United States responded with 
a vaguely worded statement which only implied a repetition of the previous 
declaration that Japanese hegemony over China was contrary to American 
interests. The Japanese delightedly considered the reply more friendly in tone 
than Stimson's message of 1932. They should have. The guiding principle was 
that the message be "effectively declarative and at no point vulnerable to any 
rejoinder by the Japanese government or from any quarter. Hornbeck MSS, 
Autobiographical Manuscript, box 129. Items of interest relating to the Amau 
Doctrine are printed in FRUS, Japan 1931-191*1, I 223-25, 225-27, 228-30, 230-31; 
Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 47-48, 53-71, 78-81, 88-90; and a series of items FRUS 1931*, HI, 113-153. 
8In the mid-1930's American policy toward China differed substantially 
from the hopes of Americans for China's future. The former was grounded in 
two realities: The danger to American interests which would arise if support for 
Chinas government antagonized Japan, and a recognition that the United States 
had nothing vital at stake in that exploited, underdeveloped, and ill-governed 
nation. Interests were seldom precisely defined, but to the State Department, 
interests meant the right of Americans to carry on normal activities. The prin­
ciple, not the business of trade and investment was the primary consideration. 
Moreover, American economic involvement in China was far more important to 
hina than to the United States. The low degree of American activity, as dis­
tinguished from the lofty descriptions of the potential value of the China market, 
may be best understood by observing that between 1910 and 1935 no American 
E^Dr?^116 mtssk>n even visited China. For trade and investment figures, see 
. III, 359; George H. Blakeslee, "The Foreign Stake in China," For-
Affairs, X (October, 1931), 81-91. The reference to trade missions came up 
m 1935 when a delegation from the National Foreign Trade Council, a private 
agency, visited China to inquire into the possibility of developing commercial 
relations. Hornbeck to Johnson, Jan. 16, 1935, Nelson T. Johnson MSS, LC. New 
weal efforts to expand American trade through the Reconstruction Finance 
orporation loans of 1933 was a short lived and unsuccessful experiment. See 
New York Times, June 5, 1933, p. 1, June 17, 1933, p. 4; Nixon, Roosevelt, I, 186-
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Because conditions in Europe and Asia militated against the 
arguments put forward by advocates of a more internationalist pol­
icy, particularly in the Far East where the ability of China's govern­
ment to survive was regarded as doubtful, the foundation of Ameri­
can diplomacy became a reasoned commitment to narrowly defined 
national interests.9 No one could even conceive of any circumstances 
under which the United States would find itself at war with a Euro­
pean power without allies. No one seriously believed the Japanese 
would foolishly direct a thrust against American possessions, so long 
as the naval defenses were kept up. No one believed that if by some 
horrible miscalculation the United States were attacked other nations 
would come to America's aid. No one overlooked the obvious point 
that geography alone precluded any possibility that an outbreak of 
war would immediately threaten the Western Hemisphere. In sum, the 
United States could hope for, but did not have to rely upon, the sup­
port of other nations. Public opinion did not force isolationism upon 
the United States, neither did Congressional pressure dictate that the 
policy be continued, although both deepened the administration's com­
mitment. By 1935 Roosevelt and his advisors had already concluded 
that in the absence of any universal desire for peace, the vital ques­
87; and a series of items in box 99, Hornbeck MSS. Among the political realities 
recognized by the administration: A Chinese desire to drag foreigners with no 
territorial ambitions into the Sino-Japanese dispute, the probability that Japa­
nese influence in Chinese affairs would continue to increase (and possibly at 
some future date force a capitulation by the Nationalists), and the clear evidence 
that the government of China exercised nominal authority, faced strong domestic 
political rivals, had not carried out the promised economic and social reforms, 
and in general grappled with conditions in which the disintegrating factors out­
weighed integrating factors. The two best overall treatments of American policy 
are Borg, Far Eastern Crisis, and Barbara Tuchmann, Stillwell and the Ameri­
can Experience in China 1911-1945, New York, 1970. For a review of the major 
works relating to the subject see Dorothy Borg, compiler, Historians and 
American Far Eastern Policy, New York, 1966. Specific descriptions, including 
the semi-annual reports on conditions in China, are available in FRUS 1934, III, 
13-15, 217-20, 344-48; FRUS 1935, HI, 7-9, 9-11, 13-15, 18-19, 44-45, 45-49, 59-60. 
These reports, and others, were pulled together in policy reviews forwarded to 
the White House. See Nixon, Roosevelt, I, 539-41, 567-70, 594-95, 610, 654-61, 
FRUS 1934, III, 189-93. Roosevelt held a sentimental view of China, considered 
himself an expert on the subject, and felt that the chief cause of China's diffi­
culties was a continuation of colonial practices. But he did not act on these 
beliefs, except in the silver purchasing experiment which had as one feature the 
President's hope that it would contribute to an ending of control of China's 
financial institutions by foreign bankers. Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 305-07. C.f. Roose­
velt's wartime statements to Stalin on the need to end imperialism in India as 
recounted by Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 
1941-1945, New York, 1965, pp. 81, 83-84, 89-90. During the Second World War 
Roosevelt believed, for a time, that China was a great power and by declaration 
he tried to make China one. In the period under discussion here he did not hold 
this opinion. Realism and not sentimentality marked this aspect of the New Deal 
foreign policy. 
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tion of national security could be considered only when the American 
government preserved freedom of action by remaining the sole judge 
of it s own needs. Roosevelt never swerved from this principle. 
Neutrality had been formalized in American policy long before 
Roosevelt took office. Beginning with George Washington's adminis­
tration, when the need arose, Congress defined the government's 
position with regard to the pertinent international situation and, to 
insure the national policy would be carried out, provided for the 
means to regulate the conduct of citizens and alien residents. To make 
certain the government commanded and coordinated all phases of 
foreign policy, these acts granted to the chief executive additional 
powers, either previously undefined or denied him because their 
content touched domestic affairs. The statutes thus had an internal 
element, the controls, and an external component which presumed 
some foreign policy objective. The legislation had been a powerful 
and legitimate weapon in the American diplomatic arsenal. In execu­
tion, this neutrality had been malleable to the President's will. 
By the early 1930's, however, "neutrality" had taken on a num­
ber of different meanings. The word had a legal definition, it de­
scribed a "tradition" of staying out of other people's wars, and it 
was a euphemism for peace. To some, neutrality still meant the right 
of a non-belligerent to carry on trade in non-contraband materials, 
the American principle of freedom of the seas. As a slogan, neutrality 
was so powerful that advocates recommending a multitude of con-
9The letters and dispatches received by Roosevelt personally and the State 
department officially contained war warnings, pointed out the aggressive de­
signs of Germany and Italy, and expressed a uniform dismay that the govern­
ments of Europe could not agree among themselves on how to meet this danger, 
kee U.S., Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 
{M1-1U1, Washington, 1943, pp 191-92, 211-214; Nixon Roosevelt, I, 172-76, II, 
415-18, 401-04, 426-29, 437-38, 453-54, 460-64, 478-80, 486-88; FRUS 1935, I, 
9qq6qo and a s.eries of items pp. 176-309; FRUS 1935, II, a series of items pp. 
299-337. The information left Roosevelt with a feeling he was helpless to do 
any hmg constructive. Entry of March 18, 1935, Morgenthau Diaries, Book IV, 
?a i«i,/ourna^ entry °f March 22, 1935, Phillips MSS; Roosevelt to House, April 
inor CorresP°ndence file: FDR, House MSS; Roosevelt to Hull, March 9, 
i' AVC; 1935, I, 33; Roosevelt to Dodd, April 16, 1935, E. Roosevelt, Letters, 
, 475; Roosevelt to Bingham, July 11, 1935, Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 553-54. For 
policy views concerning events in the Far East, see, in addition to the items cited 
in f.n 8 above, Davis to Hull, Oct. 31, 1934, Davis MSS, box 12; Johnson to 
Uornbeck, Dec. 3, 1935 and Johnson to Stimson, Dec. 9, 1935; Johnson MSS; 
org, Far Eastern Crisis, p. 175; John Van Antwerp MacMurray, former Min-
China, to Hull, Nov. 1, 1935, RDS, 711.93/383, and related items in the 
acMurray MSS, Firestone Library of Princeton University, box 147; Secretary 
oi War George H. Dern to Roosevelt, Dec. 20, 1935, Roosevelt MSS, PSF: Dern, 
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flicting foreign policies all claimed to be representing the true faith.10 
From the end of the First World War onward, exponents of 
neutrality legislation who supported the embargoing of war materials 
and commodities to cooperate with other governments in imposing 
economic sanctions, believed to be an effective means to deter aggres­
sion, clashed with opponents who contended that the use of sanctions 
was an unneutral act. Proposals authorizing the President to em­
bargo selectively shipments of arms, munitions, and implements of 
war to belligerent governments were closely examined to see whether 
or not they would aid in furthering the cause of peace. It was over 
the interpretation of the ends of the proposed resolutions, world 
peace or non-belligerency for the United States, that the bitter de­
bates took place. The smoke of the battle over the advisability of en­
trusting the President with discretionary embargo powers blinded 
the participants to the fact that they usually agreed in principle on 
the equally important question of who should control the nation's war 
production.11 
Much of the ammunition used in the neutrality debates was 
drawn from the studies of the relationship among arms manufactur­
ers, governments, and the origins of war. Acting on the hypothesis 
that the machinations of evil men in search of profit were a clear 
and present danger, neutrality advocates of all persuasions offered 
proposals to control the manufacture and trade in arms. Roosevelt 
shared this conviction that government regulation and supervision 
10For the various laws which fall under the definition of neutrality legisla­
tion, see Francis Deak and Phillip C. Jessup, eds., A Collection of Neutrality 
Laws, Regulations and, Treaties of Various Countries, 2 Vols., Washington, 1939, 
II, 1079-1262. By one definition, "neutrality, strictly speaking, consists in absti­
nence from any participation in a public, private, or civil war, and impartiality 
of conduct toward both parties thereto." U.S. v. The Three Friends, Fla. 166 
U.S. 1. See 41 U.S. (Law Ed.) 897 and 914. For changes in definition, and the 
difficulties of applying neutrality after defining it, see Green Haywood Hack-
worth, Digest of International Law, 7 Vols., Washington, 1943, VII, 379-80; 
Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 13 Vols., Dept. of State 
Pubn. 8354, Washington, 1968, XI, 139 ff. 
nRobert Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, Chicago, 1962, treats the domestic 
struggles over neutrality in great detail. For an outline of the basic arguments 
used by the participants, see Whitney H. Shepardson, "Nationalism and Ameri­
can Trade," and two articles by Charles Warren, "Troubles of a Neutral" and 
"Safeguards to Neutrality," Foreign Affairs, XII (April, 1934), 403-17; XII 
(April, 1934), 377-94; XIV (January, 1936), 199-215. Both favored allowing the 
President freedom of action. John Bassett Moore, "An Appeal to Reason," For­
eign Affairs XI (July, 1933), 536 ff. argues the case for mandatory and restric­
tive legislation. These arguments were presented to a congressional committee in 
1933. Subsequent hearings and debates tended to cover the same ground. See U.S. 
Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Exportation of Arms or Muni­
tions of War, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Rep­
resentatives, on H.J. Res. 93, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 1933, pp. 1-36. 
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was advisable. Deeply impressed with the spectacular revelations of 
Senator Gerald P. Nye's Special Munitions Investigating Committee, 
the President took the first initiative to place neutrality laws on the 
books.12 
Beyond this, however, Roosevelt's thinking was not fixed. He 
indicated that he considered it desirable to have the power to em­
bargo shipments of war materials to belligerents, but he did not call 
this a vital feature of neutrality legislation. He opposed war profi­
teering. He spoke favorably about measures which warned American 
citizens that if they traveled or conducted business in war zones or 
made loans they would do so without enjoying the automatic protec­
tion of the American government. But at no time did he gather all 
these loose ends together and place the power of his office behind a 
comprehensive neutrality program. State Department personnel made 
the major effort to get discretionary powers for the President en­
acted. Roosevelt agreed to this program, but not enthusiastically, and 
his consent came after pressure from the bloc in Congress grouped 
around Senator Nye indicated the administration might be faced 
12The exposes, the origins of the "merchants of death" thesis and the muni­
tions investigation are covered in Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and 
American Foreign Relations, Minneapolis, 1962, and John E. Wiltz, In Search of 
Peace, The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36, Baton Rouge, 1963. For the in­
formation readily available to Roosevelt, his views on neutrality prior to sug­
gesting to Nye on March 19, 1935, that his committee draft legislation, and the 
President's request for recommendations, see also Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 187-91, 
222, 442-43; New York Times, Dec. 13, 1934, p. 1; Norman Davis to Henry 
Haskell, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Feb. 12, 1934, Davis 
MSS, box 2; Memorandum by Charles Warren, R. Walton Moore MSS, box 13, 
FDRL; Roosevelt to Hull, Dec. 8, 1934, with enclosures and R. Walton Moore, 
Confidential memorandum of Dec. 20, 1934, Roosevelt MSS, OF 178: Munitions, 
1934. For Roosevelt's initiation of legislative action see New York Times, March 
20, 1935, pp. 1, 9; March 31, p. 26; Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 447-50. Reports as to 
what Roosevelt said to Nye and members of the Munitions Committee vary in 
wording, but they agree on the point that the President emphasized a desire for 
laws to keep the United States out of war and encouraged Nye to introduce 
legislation. Roosevelt's suggestion differed from the State Department's aim of 
getting authority to regulate the arms trade so the American government could 
cooperate in controlling the world traffic in arms. In any event, Roosevelt's 
remarks, reported by the British Embassy as a statement that legislation to 
take "the war out of neutrality" was more important than legislation to "take 
the profts out of war," was construed by Nye as a request to submit legislative 
recommendations, and Nye proceeded accordingly. RBFO, A 3483/3483/45, F.O. 
371/18772. Whether Roosevelt was expressing a thought representing a matured 
conclusion or whether it was just a chance remark is not known, but the circum­
stances and setting are similar to the President's revelation of unconditional 
surrender as a war policy in 1943. To this writer, it appears that in both cases 
Roosevelt had not planned a statement beforehand, but when the subject came 
up he expressed his real feelings. C.f. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt, The 
Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945, New York, 1970, p. 383. 
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with the passage of laws restricting the President's activities.13 
The real battle over neutrality legislation developed after the 
State Department proposal was presented to Congress. Concerned 
about the danger of war which could result from the expected con­
frontation between Italy and Ethiopia, the administration desired 
to have at hand the temporary authority to shut off the flow of war 
supplies to Italy. Efforts to secure this power promptly aroused the 
ire of the Nye group who suspected, correctly, the president was in­
terested in cooperating in an international program to levy economic 
sanctions. In the ensuing struggle, complicated by a number of un­
related domestic political factors, the administration forces con­
ducted themselves poorly. Amidst the greatest possible confusion, 
Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions, maneuvered through Congress a bill supposedly representing 
compromises by all factions. It was a curious conglomeration of con­
tradictory provisions taken from the major features of several dif­
ferent neutrality proposals, some rewritten by Pittman, and it satis­
fied no one. Roosevelt's advisors had a number of initial objections 
to the bill, although the President was not greatly upset by it. At 
first most advisors considered the act restrictive, but within a short 
time they and the President were looking with interest at studies 
which suggested that the neutrality law was a most useful weapon 
of diplomacy.14 
The operative section of the 1935 act provided that "upon the 
outbreak or during the progress of war" between foreign states "the 
President shall proclaim such fact." Thereafter, shipments of arms, 
implements, and munitions of war to the belligerents were unlawful. 
18Divine, Illusion, pp. 81-121; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 
New York, 1948,1, 397-417; Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 470-76, 558-59, 578-79; Joseph C. 
Green to Hull, July 9, 1935; Memorandum by Green, July 22, 1935; J.C.G. to 
Davis, Aug. 24, 1935, Davis MSS, box 2. Green became the first head of the 
Munitions Control Board established by the 1935 act. 
14Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 601-02, 605-07, 607-10, 632-33, 634-37; Green to Mof­
fat, Oct. 12, 1934, Moffat MSS. New York Times, Aug. 22, 23, 24, 1935, p. 1; Aug. 
25, 1935, p. 5; Hull to Stimson, Aug. 22, 1935, Hull MSS, folder 85; New York 
Herald Tribune, Aug 28, 1935, p. 1. For the interpretative studies of the Neutral­
ity Act of 1935 see Moore to Roosevelt, Aug. 28, 1935; Hull to Roosevelt, Aug. 29, 
1935; Moore to Roosevelt, Dec. 31, 1935, Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 623-28, 630-32, III, 
149-50; M.F. Perkins, State Department Historical Advisor, to Hull, Aug. 26,1935; 
New York Bar Association Draft Report, n.d., Hull MSS, folder 356; Hornbeck 
to R. Walton Moore, Sept. 28, 1935, to Hull, Oct. 3, 1935, Hornbeck MSS, box 97; 
Clyde Eggleton, "The Recent Neutrality Legislation," New York University Law 
Quarterly Review, XIII (November, 1935), 721-81; "American Neutrality Re­
considered," Columbia Law Review, XXXVI (January, 1936), 105-44, esp. pp. 
124-28. 
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It was mandatory in that the embargo applied to all parties to a con­
flict, discretionary because the President did not have to invoke the 
act until he wanted to. The freedom this allowed was not lost on Con­
gressmen determined to restrict the President's powers, and during 
the 1936 struggle for revision they were pleased to find Roosevelt 
agreeable to a change bringing the embargo provision into effect 
"whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war." 
This wording, supposedly more restrictive, really allowed the Chief 
Executive more latitude than before. An addition made in 1937 also 
placed civil wars large enough to endanger world peace under the 
statute. 
The 1935 law created a National Munitions Control Board em­
powered to license and supervise arms shipments. Armaments manu­
facturers and traders, dependent upon government contracts for their 
business, hastened to comply with the act. As a result, for the first 
time in American history, the arms industry came under direct gov­
ernment regulation in peacetime. The statute also attempted to make 
certain the United States would never again be caught up in the 
involvements which preceded America's entry into the First World 
War. Carrying munitions abroad for use by belligerents, prohibiting 
the entry of submarines of a belligerent into American ports, warning 
American citizens against travel on vessels of a belligerent, prohibit­
ing loans to belligerent governments (added in 1936), but allowing 
them short term credits (a 1937 compromise), and the banning of 
armaments on American merchant ships all were intended to isolate 
Americans, and the country, from war. But in 1937 a two year trial 
cash and carry provision was added, allowing trade in wartime. Be­
cause there were so many different features within the acts, coming 
into force under separate circumstances, the President could pick, 
choose, and then justify whatever he did in the name of neutrality.15 
Roosevelt practiced neutrality selectively, first, by finding in 
existence a war between Italy and Ethiopia, invoking the neutrality 
act and shutting off arms shipments, thereby effectively discrimi­
nating against the Italian interests. Although disheartened at the 
failure of the collective effort to impose sanctions against agression— 
1549 Stat. 1081 (1935); 49 Stat. 1152 (1936); 50 Stat. 121 (1937). Divine, 
Illusion, p. 158, contends that the 1936 revision of the operative clause was re­
strictive. Phillips Bradley, "International Relations," American Political Science 
Review, III (Feb., 1937), 100-13, argues persuasively that the change allowed 
wore discretion. 
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which immediately reinforced his conviction that a more interna­
tionalist American policy was unworkable—he was pleased at the 
popularity and usefulness of the neutrality statute. It was a device, 
he said, which could keep America out of war yet allow the United 
States to refuse aid to predator nations. During the Spanish Civil 
War Roosevelt laid a similar embargo, again executing a foreign 
policy decision under a neutrality act. But in the Sino-Japanese con­
flict he conveniently did not find a state of war to exist because the 
prohibitions which would automatically follow his declaration would 
aid Japan against China. Hull explained that it would be unneutral 
for the United States to formally recognize a state of war when the 
nations involved had not done so.16 
Between 1938 and 1941 Roosevelt moved step by step (or, as 
James MacGregor Burns describes it, he took a bold step forward 
16For American policy during the Italo-Ethiopian crisis see FRUS 193U, 
II, 754-74; FRUS 1935, I, 595-857 Hull, Memoirs, I, 431-34; Rosenman, Papers, 
IV, 373-75; Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 493-95, 547, 610-14, III, several items, pp. 3-42; 
Hornbeck to Hull, Oct. 5, 1935, Hornbeck MSS, Secretary of State 1932-1937; 
Department of State, Press Releases 1935, p. 382. Roosevelt expressed his delight 
at the usefulness of the neutrality act in a number of letters. See Nixon, Roose­
velt, II, 43-44, 84-85, 94-95, 102-03, 121, III, 102-03; Roosevelt MSS, PSF: State 
Dept. (1933-35), PSF: Poland ('36-'38). The British government fully under­
stood that Roosevelt was willing to assist in imposing sanctions against Italy. 
However, British policy fundamentally was not to risk war but to isolate Italy 
diplomatically and get Mussolini to settle on British terms. When at the brink, 
fearful of not getting French support, the British government rejected collective 
action involving force. Instead, under the plan authored by foreign Secretary 
Sir Samuel Hoar and French Premier Pierre Laval, Mussolini was offered a 
method of allowing Italy to take by treaty what she was taking in war. The 
evolution of British policy may be traced in RBFO, A. 7729/3483/45, F.O. 371/ 
18772; J 3806/1/1, F.O. 371/19125; J 5429/1/1, F.O. 371/19139; J 8911/ 
1/1, J 8758/1/1, F.O. 371/19166; J 2381/97/1, F.O. 371/19186. A lengthy review 
and analysis of Britain role in the crisis was conducted in 1936. See the undated 
memorandum filed with "Future Policy of His Majesty's Government in Regard 
to the League of Nations," June 3, 1936, W 5075/79/98, F.O. 371/20473. Anthony 
Eden, Facing the Dictators, Boston, 1962; Robert A. Friedlander, "New Light on 
the Anglo-American Reaction to the Ethiopian War 1935-36," Mid America, 
XLV (April, 1963), 115-25; and Henderson B. Braddick, "The Hoar-Laval Plan: 
A Study in International Politics," Journal of Modern History, XXXIV (March, 
1962), 64-73, round out the story. Friedlander's high evaluation of Ambassador 
Breckenridge Long's influence in turning Roosevelt away from imposing oil 
sanctions should be balanced against the items in FRUS 1935, I, 667-69, 801-07; 
Nixon, Roosevelt, III, 28-29. Roosevelt, not inclined in 1934 and the first half of 
1935 to place much hope in getting any results by cooperating with Britain, had 
in the Italo-Ethiopian crisis reversed his policy. Revelation of the Hoar-Laval 
proposal left the President disillusioned, and he returned to his former position. 
Nixon, Roosevelt, III, 111-12, 130, 152-56; Roosevelt to Cudahay, Jan. 21, 1936, 
Roosevelt MSS, PSF: Poland 36-38. For the later application of the neutrality 
statutes see Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 322-23, 329; Department 
of State, Press Releases, 1937, pp. 223-24, 227. 
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then executed his customary backward hop) away from his policy of 
isolating the United States from war. His goal of achieving national 
security did not change, now only he intended to realize it by seeing 
to the survival of the Atlantic democracies. As his foreign policy 
shifted, domestic critics tore at him, friendly nations requested faster 
and more effective action, while unfriendly governments concluded 
alliances and issued warnings. To justify himself in the face of all 
these admonishments, Roosevelt reported to the American people 
that his sole aim was to implement their desire to be powerful and 
peaceful. Neutrality became the President's sheathed sword and 
his shield.17 
In any discussion of neutrality laws and their effect on foreign 
policy, several related but separable questions have been comingled. 
One of these, and by far the easiest to answer conclusively, is whether 
it was essential to have a statutory policy to maintain neutrality. 
The answer is that many elements in American society, including the 
President, thought it was. The real question here is not whether neu­
trality legislation was considered desirable but what form it should 
take. When asked directly, Roosevelt usually fudged this issue, but 
he definitely wanted laws which would protect him from drifting 
into the kind of involvements which bedeviled Woodrow Wilson. 
The second question is whether or not Roosevelt felt the neu­
trality acts cut into his powers. He did not protest the laws; his criti­
cal comments were directed at the groups in Congress who were un­
willing to expand his authority. This reaction stands in sharp con­
trast to the President's bitter denunciations of the Supreme Court 
and his violent attacks against legislators he considered obstruc­
tionists. This denial by Congress may be considered restrictive; how­
ever, no other president, except when granted the prerogative for a 
limited time, had ever possessed the right to impose domestic controls 
over commodity exports to distinguish between aggressor and victim. 
Yet, during the period, Roosevelt gave the impression that he agreed 
with the assumption that the statutes directed his policy. The evi­
dence on this point is mixed, but it appears more accurate to say 
that in the conduct of his foreign policy he was concerned with the 
17Burns, Roosevelt, p. 132. 
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implied check of public opinion rather than with legal restrictions.18 
The third question is whether or not the neutrality laws con­
flicted with Roosevelt's foreign policy goals. They didn't. Initially, 
the legislation aided the Chief Executive by allowing him to make 
the American presence felt while removing the United States from 
zones of hostilities. The use of neutrality in this manner is often 
described as a rejection of the doctrine of collective security by the 
United States, but it wasn't. The President never had that alterna­
tive. The nations who later formed the wartime allied coalition were 
unwilling in the mid-1930's to muster for defense at the point of 
conflict, neither did they have the political solidarity, moral com­
munity, and confidence to consider aggression directed against one 
18C.f. Roosevelt's reactions to neutrality legislation and the court's decision 
in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States. 295 U.S. 495. Nixon, 
Roosevelt, II, 634-37; E. Roosevelt, ed., Letters, I, 506-07; Rosenman, Papers, IV, 
200-20. Roosevelt's views on the powers of the presidency may be found in the 
narrative accompanying the documents published in this series in Vol. II, 202-06, 
246-47, 247-48, Vol. IV, 9-10. The question of what constitutes public opinion is 
very delicate. Everyone seems to know what it was, but all sources produce 
more interpretation than evidence. In two isolated events, the 1935 proposals that 
the United States adhere to the World Court protocols and the 1937 debate over 
Louis Ludlow's war referendum resolution, there appears to have been a popular 
reaction against a foreign policy of entanglement. But upon investigation, what 
is called public opinion during the World Court fight turns out to be the expres­
sion of the vociferous groups. The administration recognized this, although it 
was not certain how to deal with the phenomenon. See New York Times, Jan. 30, 
1935, p. 1; Jan. 31, p. 18; Feb. 13, IV, 3; Feb. 12, p. 20; Washington Post, Feb. 6, 
1935, p. 8; Nixon, Roosevelt, II, 381. Roosevelt said that Walter Lippmann had 
provided the best explanation of what had happened in the World Court fight, 
but Lippmann's analysis, which appeared in the New York Herald-Tribune on 
Feb. 2, 1935, was based on the assumption that an overwhelming isolationist 
sentiment existed. This also happened to be" one of Lippmann's convictions in 
1935, and his demonstration of proof is a tautological argument. The war referen­
dum is a different matter. The Ludlow proposal, calling for a popular vote to 
decide on a declaration of war (H.J. Res. 199, printed in Congressional Record, 
81, April 6, 1937, p. 3198) was almost forced out of House Committee by a dis­
charge petition after the Japanese attack in China, Roosevelt's "Quarantine 
Speech," Italy's exit from the League, and the bombing of the U.S. gunboat 
Panay. Supporters of the resolution offered public opinion polls showing that 
73% of the American people favored a referendum on war, 73% thought there 
would be another war, 56% felt the United States could stay out, and 69% were 
in favor of stricter neutrality laws. See Congressional Record, 82, Nov. 22, 1937, 
pp. 242-48; Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1938, p. 2; and similar items Hadley Cantril, 
ed., Public Opinion 1935-1946, Princeton, 1951, pp. 966 ff. The polls also showed 
the American people favored national defense, resisting aggression, and main­
taining peace by all honorable means. In the party platforms for 1936 the Demo­
crats, in addition, dedicated themselves to taking profits out of war and being 
on guard against being drawn into a conflict by political commitments to inter­
national banking or private trade. The Republicans vowed that maintaining 
peace meant not forging alliances. The Communist party came out in favor of 
collective security and the Socialists pledged to oppose rearmament. Kirk H. 
Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, Compilers, National Party Platforms 1840-
1956, Urbana, 1956, pp. 359-69. In sum, a strong public opinion now reinforced 
the neutrality position Roosevelt had taken in 1935. 
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party worth a declaration of war by all parties. What Roosevelt re­
jected in 1935 was cooperative or coalition diplomacy with Great 
Britain, which, he felt, offered many risks without corresponding 
advantages.19 
Between 1937 and 1939, even though denied discretionary powers 
to embargo exports selectively, the neutrality legislation did not 
hinder Roosevelt in his search for methods of opposing aggression 
without going to war. His real difficulties were three: no one could 
figure out how to check the dictators without fighting, the United 
States was unprepared for war, and not everybody felt a war would 
necessarily have to involve the United States. Other than neutrality, 
Roosevelt had no policy at this time and thus could not (or felt he 
could not) mobilize public opinion to support an alternative. But upon 
the outbreak of World War II, he asked for new legislation and after 
a stru£gle, but without serious compromises, successfully overrode 
the isolationist bloc in Congress and obtained the authority to supply 
aid to friendly governments. This new foreign policy repealed the 
principle of neutrality in the name of neutrality. As practiced, Roose­
velt s policy rapidly distilled into supplying all aid to the allies at 
the risk of war.20 
The final question is whether or not Congress curtailed the 
resident s freedom by placing mandatory restrictions within the 
neutrality acts. The interesting point raised here is what would have 
appened had Roosevelt openly violated one of these provisions. Any 
answer has to be a hypothetical construction because to date, the 
question of the constitutionality of an act proscribing executive pow-
1 qo ^orei^n relations has never been decided. But in 
6, in delivering an opinion on a related subject, the Supreme Court 
defined the President's authority very broadly. According to the 
ourt, the sovereign powers of the American government could be 
ivided into internal and external aspects, with essential differences 
tivA Q?" c°lle^ive security, the examination by Kenneth W. Thompson, "Collec-
iqocfe$"™y Reexamined," American Political Science Review, XLVII (Sept., 
20TP Stl11 h°ldS UP' 
nn 94?^af-d.S- ,Corwin> The President, Office and Powers, New York, 1948, 
whicbtvlU !ts the major decisions taken after the fall of France in 1940 by 
Charlpc A S n ,° -the United States changed from neutral to quasi belligerent. 
h/v! io« eard^''?idw< Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1U1, New 
American r.' ^1' ^09-15, 574-84, in indicting Roosevelt for lying to the 
Drovisinne fe°ii!e' -iRopVlres a much l°n&er resume. The remaining restrictive 
the nrnv^ • the 1939 Neutrality Act were repealed on Nov. 13, 1941. See also 
ReaShU£» XT" the Neutrality Act of Nov. 4, 1939, 76th Cong., 2d sess., Public 
ment nf tv, ?» ^4. Burns, Roosevelt, pp. 3-167, provides the best general treat­
ment ot the President s policy aims from 1939-1941. 
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between them. While the states and the people share in domestic sov­
ereignty, in external affairs the federal authority is complete, and 
only the President is empowered to exercise it. The Court did not 
rule out the possibility that some forms of restrictive legislation might 
be constitutional; it merely said the question remained to be decided. 
But as the Court then went on to admonish Congress that it would 
be unwise to lay down narrowly defined standards by which the 
President is to be governed, there is at least the suggestion that a con­
stitutional test would have been resolved in favor of the Chief 
Executive.21 
The neutrality laws did not preselect Roosevelt's foreign policy, 
neither did they control his responses to the great crises in the inter­
national order. All the debates over the wisdom of passing neutrality 
legislation and the provisions of the statutes enacted not withstand­
ing, nothing changed the simple fact that in the conduct of foreign 
relations the President was the nation's plenary and single agent. 
21 Curtiss-Wright Export, et al. v. United States: 299 U.S. 311-29; 81 U.S., 
Law Ed., pp. 255-70; The case began with the return of an indictment in the 
federal court for the Southern District of New York. Development of the argu­
ments over the Chief Executive's powers may be traced in printed documents. 
See 14 F Supp. 230 and U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating 
the Munitions Industry, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 206, 73d Cong., 2d sess., 
1934, 39 Volumes, XXXIX, 13373-90. For analysis see Temple Law Quarterly, XI 
(April, 1937), pp. 418-21) Fordham Law Review, VI (May, 1937), 303-06; 
Texas Law Review, XV (April, 1937), 372-73; Wisconsin Law Review, XII 
(April, 1937), 400-02. Corwin, President, pp. 206-74 covers the broader subject of 
the president's conduct of foreign relations. Only once did a neutrality act be­
come the subject of a court decision. In 1939, the government successfully con­
tended that the neutrality statute applied to Filipinos the same prohibitions 
affecting American citizens. The presiding judge upheld the constitutionality of 
the Act of 1939 as a valid exercise of the executive's sovereign power over foreign 
affairs. 37 F Supp. 268; Hackworth, Digest, VII, 643-45. 
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The roots of the Cold War lie deeply embedded in the history of 
relations between Soviet Russia and the western powers since the 
October Revolution. In more immediate terms, however, the Cold 
War grew out of East-West tensions after 1945, especially in eastern 
Europe and in Germany. Today, more than a quarter of a century 
later, much of the passion has gone out of the Cold War, and the West 
has reconciled itself to a Communized eastern Europe. But Germany 
continues as the last major remnant of the Cold War in Europe. 
The traditional approach to the history of the Cold War has 
attributed the conflict to the aggressive, expansionist tendencies of 
the Soviet Union, which evoked a defensive reaction on the part of 
the West, led by the United States.1 This view has been challenged 
by a movement of revision, which portrays Soviet policy in a more 
favorable light and, in its more extreme form, assumes the best in 
analyzing Soviet policies and motives, while assuming the worst about 
American policies and motives.2 
This paper, through its analysis of the course of East-West rela­
tions in Germany from 1945 to 1949, seeks to restore some balance to 
the Cold W ar debate. It proceeds on the basis that the German ques­
tion cannot be considered in isolation from broader Cold War issues 
and that events in Germany both influenced, and were influenced by, 
the course of East-West relations generally. It also suggests that de­
velopments in Germany and in the Cold War as a whole can be best 
understood as the consequence of the fear and suspicions which existed 
on both sides and of the resultant defensive postures which were 
adopted. 
In a brief paper, it is impossible to discuss the course of Allied 
JThis view is presented, for example, in John Spanier, American Foreign 
Policy Since World War II, second revised edition, New York, 1965. 
Representative of the strongly revisionist accounts are D. F. Fleming, The 
Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, 2 vols., Garden City, N. Y., 1961 and Gar 
Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, New York, 1965. More 
moderate reexaminations are provided by Andre Fontaine, History of the Cold. 
War, 2 vols., New York, 1968 and by Louis J. Halle in his magisterial The Cold 
War as History, New York, 1968. 
AMERICA, GERMANY, AND THE COLD WAR, 1945-1949 45 
discussions on the German question during World War II. But note 
should be made of the Yalta Conference of February 1945 and its 
decisions affecting Germany. At Yalta, discussion of the German 
question involved four issues: the approval of the occupation zones 
and control machinery proposed by the European Advisory Commis­
sion, with debate centering on the proposal for French participation, 
the establishment of a western frontier for Poland at Germany's 
expense, dismemberment, and reparations. 
The British strongly desired French involvement in Germany, 
as a part of their effort to foster France's reemergence as a factor in 
the European balance of power. President Roosevelt initially opposed 
the British suggestion that France be granted an occupation zone and 
an equal voice in the Allied Control Council, as did Stalin. But when 
Roosevelt changed his mind, Stalin readily followed suit.3 The Soviet 
leader apparently did not care one way or the other and agreed with 
Roosevelt, perhaps in the hope of gaining a few negotiating chips 
which he could cash in later on an issue of greater concern. Paradox­
ically, although this decision was reached with a minimum of discord, 
it would remain of importance in the future, long after the issues of 
dismemberment and reparations had been all but forgotten. 
On the matter of Poland's western frontier, Stalin proved to be 
much less pliable, insisting on the line of the Oder and Neisse rivers. 
Churchill and Roosevelt refused to make any specific commitments, 
and the final statement represented the extent of disagreement. While 
recognizing that "Poland must receive substantial accessions of ter­
ritory in the North and the West," the "final delimitation of the 
Western frontier of Poland should . . . await the Peace Conference."4 
During the course of wartime discussions, the Allies had first 
been inclined to favor the dismemberment of Germany and had then 
begun to lose interest in it. Although the Soviets appeared to regard 
the issue as of secondary importance, they pressed for an agreement 
on the specifics of dismemberment. Their adamant negotiating prob­
ably resulted from their not entirely unfounded fear that the western 
powers, especially Great Britain, would oppose the destruction of 
Germany's industrial strength and would instead concentrate on re­
building Anglo-German commercial relations. Once again, Churchill 
3Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences 
of Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, 1955, pp. 576, 616-618, 710-711, 899-900 
(hereafter cited as Yalta Documents). 
Mbid., pp. 905-907. 
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and Roosevelt refused to make specific commitments, beyond agreeing 
to include the word "dismemberment" in the terms of surrender. The 
method of dismemberment" in the terms of surrender. The method of 
dismembering Germany was assigned to a special commission to 
work out.5 This commission soon went far afield in procedural mat­
ters, and when the Allies continued to lose interest in dismemberment, 
the commission ceased functioning by the autumn of 1945.6 
Although the question of dismemberment quickly passed into 
oblivion, the issue of reparations did not. The German invasion had 
devastated much of Russia, and the Soviets called for substantial 
German reparations in kind, proposing a total of $20 billion, with half 
of th at amount going to the U. S. S. R. Churchill was concerned about 
the role of the German economy in postwar Europe and thus opposed 
the Soviet demand, arguing that "if you wished a horse to pull a 
wagon . . . you would at least have to give it fodder." An angry Stalin 
retorted that "care should be taken to see that the horse did not turn 
around and kick you" and called on Churchill to "say so frankly" if 
he opposed reparations for Russia. President Roosevelt was sympa­
thetic to the Soviet proposals, but the British remained adamantly 
opposed to them. After bitter debate, the three statesmen agreed to 
the establishment of a Reparations Commission to work out the de­
tails. The Soviets and Americans agreed that this Commission should 
take the proposed $20 billion sum as a basis of discussion, with the 
British in opposition.7 The Yalta Protocol on Reparations reflected 
the Allies' views on an issue which would plague relations among the 
victors for the next several years. While there was no commitment 
to the sum of $20 billion except as a basis for discussion, the United 
States was prepared to accept the Soviet proposal. The only reason 
why the American commitment was not more complete was because 
of British objections. The Soviets had reason to believe that the 
United States did in fact support the $20 billion figure and would 
continue to do so and, understandably, they became bitter when the 
American position shifted. 
The issues which the Yalta Conference had left unresolved came 
before the Potsdam Conference which began its deliberations in mid-
July 1945. In the five months since Yalta, the Soviet pattern of domi­
5Ibid., pp. 611-615, 656-657, 660, 700-701, 978. 
6Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 191*5, III, 
Washington, 1968, 160-368. 
f t i, lTal ta  D ocuments, pp. 620-622 , 631-633 , 807-809 , 812 , 885 , 901-903 , 909, 914-916, 978-979. 
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nation in eastern Europe had begun to emerge, and tensions among 
the wartime allies were growing. 
The Potsdam conferees readily affirmed the Yalta accord on 
occupation zones and for the creation of a four-power Allied Control 
Council, which would coordinate policies for the four zones.8 Bitter de­
bate ensued, however, on the issues of reparations and the western 
boundary of Poland. On the former issue, the Soviets proved to be 
tractable and agreed to drop, at least temporarily, their original in­
sistence on a total reparations bill of $20 billion and, indeed, on any 
fixed sum. The Potsdam agreement provided that each power would 
exact reparations from its own zone and, in addition, the Soviets 
would receive fifteen percent of the industrial equipment removed 
from the western zones in exchange for raw materials from their 
zone, plus an additional ten percent without any counter-deliveries. 
The Soviets' willingness to abandon their original demands was en­
couraged by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' implication that, in 
return for Soviet concessions on reparations, the United States would 
support the Soviet proposals regarding the Polish frontier. The 
Soviets thus gave way on what had become for them the less impor­
tant issue, especially since they had apparently been assured of sub­
stantial reparations in some form.9 
As the Soviets viewed the future, they could not be certain that 
Germany would not be reunited within a few years, and they viewed 
the cession of a sizable portion of German territory to Poland as one 
sure way of reducing Germany's potential future strength. To em­
phasize their determination, the Soviets had already placed the por­
tion of their zone east of the line of the Oder and Western Neisse 
rivers under Polish administration. Curiously, if the Soviets had been 
willing to settle for a smaller cession of territory to Poland, leaving, 
for example, Stettin and part of S ilesia in their own zone, the German 
Democratic Republic would today be a more viable state. The western 
powers were reluctant to place the Polish frontier at the Oder-West­
ern Neisse line. They were no better able than the Soviets to divine 
the future and could not anticipate West Germany's postwar economic 
recovery nor the fact that western Germany would be able to absorb 
several million refugees from the east. They thus feared that the 
8Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference 
of Berlin, 191+5, II, Washington, 1960, 1502-1504 (hereafter cited as Potsdam 
Documents). 
$Ibid., pp. 510-520, 1505-1506; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New 
York, 1947, 79-86; Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, Garden City, N. Y., 1955, 
pp. 400-401, 404-406. 
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amputation of a sizable portion of eastern Germany would throw their 
own zones into economic chaos. The Potsdam conferees made no final 
settlement of the Polish frontier, but the Soviets' determined nego­
tiating won a substantial acceptance of their wishes. Pending the 
"final determination" of Poland's western frontier at the peace con­
ference, the area claimed by Poland would remain under Polish 
administration.10 
An examination of the other Potsdam agreements concerning 
Germany demonstrates the lack of any clear agreement among the 
conferees. The Potsdam Protocol, for example, called for the decen­
tralization of the Germany economy, in order to eliminate "the present 
excessive concentration of economic power," but there was no attempt 
to define "excessive." All industry not required for "permitted pro­
duction" would be removed, but "permitted production" was not de­
fined. In all zones, the German population would be treated equally, 
but only "so far as is practicable." Local self-government should be 
reestablished through elected councils, but only to the extent "con­
sistent with military security and the purposes of military occupa­
tion." While basic civil liberties were guaranteed, this guarantee 
would be s ubject to "the necessity for maintaining military security." 
The Protocol further provided that Germany was to be treated as an 
economic unit, governed by "common policies," but then added that 
"in applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, 
of varying local conditions." Finally, the Potsdam Protocol provided 
no clear distinction between the issues concerning Germany as a 
whole, which would be administered by the four-power Allied Control 
Council, and matters which came within the jurisdiction of each zonal 
commander.11 
The Potsdam Protocol was designed to provide the guidelines for 
the Control Council to follow in unanimously determining the specific 
policies to be executed. In the best of circumstances, with harmonious 
relations prevailing among the four powers, the Protocol would be 
subject to varying interpretations. When the occupying powers be­
came divided in their basic attitudes and interests, the Potsdam Pro­
tocol be came the basis for interminable wrangling. 
While the Potsdam Conference was in progress, the Allied Con­
trol Council was established in Berlin and set up its machinery with 
little difficulty. But the first substantive problems quickly appeared. 
10Potsdam Documents, p. 1509. 
"Ibid., pp. 1501-1505. 
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Fearing a restoration of German power, the French frequently re­
sorted to their veto to obstruct any effort to create central adminis­
trative agencies. This French obstructionism, in turn, fed Soviet sus­
picions, and Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet commander, told his 
American counterpart, General Lucius Clay, that "France was re­
ceiving too much financial assistance from the United States to main­
tain such strong opposition unless it was with our acquiescence."12 
It is difficult to be certain about Soviet intentions toward Ger­
many in the period from 1945 to 1948. The traditional Cold War view 
is that the Soviets had undertaken a consistent and determined effort 
directed toward the eventual communization of Germany. From what 
we now know—and that, unfortunately, is all too little—Soviet policy 
makers were uncertain as to what their policy should be, apart from 
supporting Poland's territorial claims and exacting as much in repara­
tions as possible. In the political sphere, Soviet policy was inconsis­
tent. Wolfgang Leonhard, a German Communist who returned from 
Moscow in the company of Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht, re­
called the instructions he and his associates received in the spring 
of 1945: 
Our political task was not to consist of establishing socialism 
in Germany or encouraging a socialist development. On the 
contrary, this must be condemned and resisted as a dan­
gerous tendency. Germany was on the threshold of a bour­
geois-democratic transformation . . . The policy was there­
fore to support this process and to repudiate every kind of 
socialist slogan which under present day conditions could be 
nothing more but pure demagogy.13 
A few weeks later, Leonhard was surprised when the Soviet authori­
ties permitted the establishment of political parties on a zonal level. 
The creation of independent Communist and Socialist 
Parties was in direct contradiction with the directives which 
we had received in Moscow in March and April, 1945 [he 
wrote], ... At that time we had been told that political 
activity could only be developed initially in the context of 
a large-scale comprehensive anti-Fascist movement. . . Now, 
on the contrary, what was being talked of was the founda­
12Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, London, 1950, p. 39. 
13Wolfgang Leonhard, Child of the Revolution, Gateway edition, Chicago, 
1958, p. 352. 
50 THE SOUTH C AROLINA HIS TORICAL AS SOCIATION 
tion of political parties. Earlier, again, it had been said that 
land reform could not be undertaken before the beginning 
of 1946. Now we were to carry out the land reform immedi­
ately after the foundation of the party in the summer of 
1945.14 
The Societs clearly were not operating on the basis of a consis­
tent plan, and the precise purposes of shifts in Soviet policy remain 
a matter of speculation, although it is possible that growing western 
ostility to the satellization of eastern Europe may have encouraged 
oscow to seek to add Germany to the Soviet's defensive perimeter, 
y the spring of 1946, Stalin and the Soviet leaders were telling "the 
ulgars and the Yugoslavs . . . that all of Germany must be ours, that 
is, Soviet, Communist."15 
Even during the first year of occupation, differences among the 
zones became increasingly evident. In the summer of 1945, the four 
political parties authorized in the Soviet zone established a united 
ront, similar to the political system in the eastern European satel­
lites, and the Communists then initiated a campaign for a merger 
with the Social Democrats. A bitter debate followed, but in April 
1946, the Social Democratic and Communist parties in the Soviet 
zone merged into the Socialist Unity Party, while the Social Demo­
cratic Party in the western zones maintained its independence. This 
was a definite setback to any Soviet hopes of gaining a predominant 
position in all of Germany. The Soviets also pressed forward with 
land reform, although there was no talk of collectivization. Given the 
attitudes of the western powers, together with the typically smaller 
land holdings of western Germany, such action was impossible in 
the western zones, and four-power discussions of land reform pro­
duced only further discord. While nationalization of industry pro­
gressed in the Soviet zone, the Americans remained committed to 
free enterprise and prevented nationalization, although the British 
Labor government would have preferred such a course. Differences 
also appeared in education, as the Soviets moved to laicize and statize 
the schools of their zone, while in the western zones the educational 
system remained largely church-run. 
Even greater differences developed between the Soviets and the 
western powers over reparations. While the Soviets carried out mas­
sive removals of capital equipment, they refused to provide the 
14/6id., p. 413. 
15Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, New York, 1962, p. 153. 
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western powers with any information concerning their removals and, 
faced with enormous needs, they did not fulfill their commitments 
regarding deliveries of food and raw materials from their zone in 
return for a part of the industrial equipment received from the west­
ern zones. The western powers were not prepared to support Soviet 
recovery while, at the same time, maintaining a strict adherence to 
the Potsdam accords on the levels of industry would prevent any 
economic recovery in the western zones, making them a liability to 
the occupying powers. Angered by the Soviets' failure to make de­
liveries, General Clay declared on April 26, 1946, that "the boundaries 
of our zone gave us a great part of the scenic beauty of Germany but 
had been accepted only on the understanding that the economic re­
sources of all Germany would be available to Germany as a whole." 
After a final attempt to reach agreement failed, General Clay, on 
May 3, 1946, suspended reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union.16 
They were never resumed, and the Potsdam agreement to treat Ger­
many as an economic unit became a dead letter. 
As disagreement mounted, the Allied Control Council became 
less capable of coordinating occupation policy and became a scene of 
discord, reproducing on German issues the larger areas of contention 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Commenting on a 
report of the Control Council in early 1947, General Clay remarked 
that it recorded "few agreed conclusions." He added: 
It did record the differences in viewpoint both as to what 
had occurred and what remained to be done. It did lay down 
in black on white clearly and succinctly the wide divergences 
which had taken place in the attempt to administer Germany 
as a unit by unanimous consent of the representatives of the 
four occupying powers.17 
If the occupying powers had been motivated by the necessity of 
cooperation which the war had provided, the differences in ideology 
and methods might have been overcome. But Germany stood at the 
center of Europe, in more than a geographical sense, and the growing 
disagreements between the Soviets and Americans in other areas 
served to intensify the discord in Germany, where the two sides were 
in immediate and continuing contact with each other. 
Just as the Allied Control Council became the scene of wrangling, 
16Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 120-122; Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19U6, V, Washington, 1969, 545-548. 
17Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 145. 
52 THE SOUTH CA ROLINA HIS TORICAL AS SOCIATION 
so, too, did the Council of Foreign Ministers' discussions of the Ger­
man question. As early as September 1945 in London, Secretary of 
State Byrnes proposed to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov the con­
clusion of a twenty-five year, four-power treaty to insure German 
disarmament. Molotov made no commitment beyond remarking that 
it was "a very interesting idea."18 In Moscow in December, Stalin 
indicated his endorsement of the proposal, but at the Paris meeting 
of the foreign ministers in the spring of 1946, Molotov insisted, much 
to Byrnes' surprise, that the treaty would serve only to postpone 
German disarmament until the end of the occupation. He charged 
the western powers with failing to carry out their existing commit­
ments for demilitarization and raised a host of other issues which 
convinced Byrnes that Molotov "had no idea of discussing the treaty 
in a serious manner but was simply looking for excuses for delay."19 
Examining the reasons for Molotov's rejection of a proposal which 
Stalin had appeared to endorse, Byrnes believed that "the Soviet 
High Command or Politburo concluded they did not want the United 
States involved in the maintenance of European security for the next 
twenty-five or forty years."20 From what we know of Stalin's rule, 
neither the High Command nor the Politburo was in a position to 
overrule his decisions. Whatever the Soviets' reasons for rejecting 
the proposed treaty, the United States became increasingly convinced 
of the improbability of reaching agreement with the Soviets on Ger­
many. This conviction was strengthened when Molotov told Byrnes 
in July 1946 that he was in no hurry to conclude a German peace 
treaty.21 During the same meeting, Molotov presented both an appeal 
to German sentiment, by condemning the long-since buried American 
plan for the pastoralization of Germany, and a violent attack upon 
American policy generally. Molotov demanded four-power control 
of the Ruhr and called for the establishment of a German regime that 
would "be able to extirpate the remnants of Fascism" and meet the 
Soviet demands for reparations.22 
The Americans and British opposed four-power control of the 
Ruhr, believing that this would provide only another forum for the 
interminable wrangling already characteristic of four-power dealings 
18Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 100-101; Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, II, Washington, 1967, pp. 267-268. 
19Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 171-175; Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19^6, II, Washington, 1970, 146-147; Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among 
Warriors, Garden City, N. Y., 1964, p. 301. 
20Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 176. 
2i/6id., p. 198. 
22Ibid., pp. 179-180; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, II, 869-873. 
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and that it would destroy the Ruhr's industries which were vital to 
Europe's economic health. Frustrated by the collapse of efforts to 
fulfill the Potsdam commitment to treat Germany as an economic 
unit, Byrnes announced on July 11, 1946, the readiness of the United 
States to merge its zone with any of the other zones. The British 
promptly accepted the proposal,23 and the economic "Bizonia" became 
effective at the beginning of 1947. 
The fruitless negotiations of the foreign ministers convinced 
Byrnes to make a full statement of America's policy toward Germany. 
This he did at the Stuttgart Opera House on September 5,1946, before 
an audience of western and German dignitaries. In a speech marking 
a major turning point in American history, Byrnes announced the 
intention of the United States to remain involved in German and 
European affairs. Making it clear that he did not intend to come in 
second to Molotov in appealing for German support, Byrnes looked 
forward to the time when the Germans could "take an honorable place 
among the members of the United Nations," and he pledged that 
Germany would not be deprived of the industry necessary to maintain 
average European living standards without outside assistance. Turn­
ing to political matters, the Secretary of State declared that the 
occupation had not been designed to establish "a prolonged alien 
dictatorship" but rather to encourage the development of political 
democracy. The German people should have primary responsibility 
for their own affairs, he said, and the United States advocated the 
early establishment of a German provisional government. Byrnes 
also condemned French proposals that the Ruhr and Rhineland be 
separated from Germany and insisted that no definite commitments 
had been made regarding Germany's eastern frontier.24 
During the following months, the battle over Germany intensi­
fied. When the foreign ministers met in Moscow in March 1947, the 
lines of division were sharply drawn in Germany and elsewhere, and 
President Truman would, within a few days, go before Congress to 
proclaim his "doctrine" of a id for Greece and Turkey. The new Ameri­
can Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, once again pro­
posed a treaty for the neutralization of Germany and, once again, 
Molotov rejected it. The foreign ministers then proceeded to wrangle 
over the Ruhr and reparations and the question of a future German 
23Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 194-197; Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19^6, II, 897-898. 
24Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 188-191; U. S. Department of State, Ger­
many, 19U7-191t9: T he Story in Documents, Washington, 1950, pp. 3-8. 
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government.25 The Moscow Conference did, however, have one major 
result: French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault became convinced 
of the futility of attempting to achieve agreement with the Soviets 
and proceeded to move toward closer collaboration with the Ameri­
cans and British.26 
The next phase of the German problem was influenced in an un­
expected way by the Marshall Plan, which became in the eyes of the 
increasingly suspicious Russians a major instrument in the American 
plan to push back the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan, the Soviet 
leaders apparently concluded, was not designed simply to assist the 
recovery of the western European economy to stave off Communism 
but had an ultimately military purpose. Having fostered the develop­
ment of western Europe's military potential, the Americans would 
then employ this strength to restore the balance of power in Europe 
and take Russia's gains away from her. This interpretation reconciled 
the two divergent Soviet views of American policy: first, that the 
Americans did not wish to extend their military presence in Europe 
and sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and, 
second, that the Americans desired to halt Soviet expansion and roll 
back the Soviet sphere. In Soviet eyes, the danger was not immediate, 
since European recovery could not be brought about overnight. But 
the establishment of a West German state would be a major step 
toward this goal and, the Soviets feared, would soon be followed by 
German remilitarization. The Soviets determined to place obstacles in 
the course of such a development. 
In an atmosphere of growing East-West hostility, the Americans 
and British moved further toward the economic and political integra­
tion of their zones, while the French increasingly adhered to the 
Anglo-American policy. Meetings of the Allied Control Council be­
came increasingly bitter until, on March 20, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky 
presented a vigorous denunciation of western policy in Germany and, 
without permitting a response, took advantage of his turn as chair­
man of the session to declare its adjournment. The Control Council 
never met again. Tension had already grown to the point where Gen­
eral Clay sensed "a change in the Soviet positions which . . . por­
tended some Soviet action in Germany." The general abandoned his 
earlier belief that "war was impossible" and now believed that such 
25Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, Philadelphia, 1950, pp-
217-226; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 307; U. S. Department of State, 
Germany, 19U7-19U9, pp. 57-63. 
26Georges Bidault, D'une resistance a I'autre, Paris, 1965, pp. 148-151. 
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a possibility could not be precluded.27 At the end of March, the Soviets 
began applying pressure at Berlin by demanding the right to examine 
the papers and baggage of all travellers on the western military trains 
entering Berlin. Clay protested against this, while the Soviets pro­
ceeded to interfere further with both rail and water traffic.28 
In the meantime, the western powers moved forward with their 
plans for currency reform, convinced of the impossibility of reaching 
agreement with the Soviets on measures to eliminate the growing 
inflation. On June 18, the western powers introduced the new cur­
rency in their zones. The Soviets responded by inaugurating measures 
to halt all surface traffic between the western sectors of Berlin and 
the western zones and by cutting off all food, coal, electric current, 
and other supplies to west Berlin from their zone.29 
In Washington, there was considerable apprehension that armed 
conflict might result and a consequent desire to avoid any provoca­
tion, while General Clay insisted on the necessity of standing firm. 
He did not expect armed conflict and concluded that if the Soviets 
did desire war, it was not because of the currency issue but because 
they believed the time was right for war.30 Washington quickly recov­
ered its composure, and the western powers indicated their determi­
nation to remain in Berlin. The airlift was established to supply the 
two and a quarter million inhabitants of west Berlin. 
The Soviets' blockade of Berlin represented a careful selection 
of place and time. The western position at Berlin appeared untenable; 
the western powers would presumably either have to abandon the 
city or give way to Soviet demands. In the United States, the election 
campaign was growing more intense, and the British stood on the 
verge of a serious economic crisis. But the We t refused to give way, 
in the conviction that the Berlin Blockade marked the first step in 
renewed Soviet efforts to seize all of Germany as the prelude to at­
tempts to establish Soviet domination of the European continent. 
In retrospect, it may be argued that the Berlin Blockade repre­
27Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 354-357; Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal 
Diaries, New York, 1951, p. 387; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 315; 
U. S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949, pp. 200-201. 
28Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 358-359; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 
407-408; U. S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949, pp. 202-203. 
29Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 362-365; Murphy, Diplomat Among War­
riors, pp. 315-316; U. S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949, pp. 203-204. 
30Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Depart­
ment, New York, 1969, pp. 261-262; Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 366; Millis, 
The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 452-455; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 316. 
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sented more of a defensive measure than an aggressive act, and that 
the Soviets were not at this point motivated by a desire to conquer 
Germany or even to turn back the western currency reform. When the 
British commander, General Robertson, suggested to Marshall Sokol-
ovsky on July 3 that an agreement on monetary reform might yet be 
worked out, Sokolovsky brushed the issue aside, declaring bluntly 
that the "technical difficulties" blocking traffic between Berlin and 
western Germany would not be resolved until the western powers 
abandoned their plans for a West German state.31 
As the Blockade continued, the western powers sought a negoti­
ated solution. On August 2, Stalin received American, British, and 
French representatives. In a relatively cordial mood, Stalin insisted 
that the Soviets had no desire to force the western powers to leave 
Berlin. "After all," he said, "we are still Allies." Stalin did not raise 
the issue of the western powers' decision to create a West German 
state and indicated that the Blockade would be lifted if the western 
powers agreed to the introduction of the Soviet zone's currency into 
west Berlin. The ambassadors regarded this offer as "promising."32 
When the western representatives sought to work out the details 
with Molotov, their optimism quickly evaporated. The Soviets now 
not only desired their currency to circulate in west Berlin but refused 
to give any assurances on the control of credit circulation in Berlin. 
The western powers saw this as a threat to the economy of their 
sectors. Furthermore, the Soviets insisted that any communique an­
nouncing East-West agreement contain a statement that a discussion 
of the establishment of a West German government had taken place 
"in an atmosphere of mutual understanding." The western powers 
saw this as a trap, believing that such terminology would suggest to 
Germans and western Europeans that the West had agreed to aban­
don plans for a West German government in exchange for some 
concessions on the Blockade.33 
In the following weeks and months, the negotiations continued, 
and they continued to be fruitless. The western airlift became in­
creasingly more successful, and western plans for a West German 
state drew closer to completion. Impelled by growing fears of Soviet 
31 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 367. 
32Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 245; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 
p. 470; U. S. Department of State, Germany, 19U7-19U9, p. 210. 
33Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, pp. 246-250; Millis, The Forrestal 
Diaries, p. 470; U. S. Department of State, Germany, 19U7-19U9, p . 211-213. 
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intentions, the western powers moved toward the establishment of 
NATO. 
The Berlin Blockade had been designed to prevent the establish­
ment of a West German state and to reduce what the Soviets saw as 
a western military threat. It had had the opposite effect. The Soviets 
gradually moved toward the acknowledgment of defeat, while hoping 
that some western concessions might still be obtained. The Blockade 
ended in May 1949, and the only concession the Soviets secured was 
an agreement for another foreign ministers' meeting, which proved 
as devoid of agreement on the central issues as the earlier meetings 
had been. 
The Soviets could, however, console themselves with the thought 
that the Blockade had not been a total loss. The western powers had 
gained no new assurances on their right of access to Berlin. There 
has been no significant increase in American military forces in Eur­
ope and, even with its monopoly of atomic weapons, the United States 
had not dared risk a military confrontation. Yet the American pos­
session of atomic weapons, with their power to devastate Soviet cities, 
served to nullify the Soviets' military superiority at Berlin. The 
Berlin crisis of 1948-1949 thus provided the first major demonstra­
tion that classical strategy had been revolutionized by the advent of 
nuclear weapons. The fear of nuclear destruction had, for the first 
time, served to freeze the status quo. 
The year 1949 marked the end of a chapter in American-Soviet 
relations. Tension after 1945 had caused the Americans to increase 
their involvement in Europe and, under American leadership, a West 
German state and a North Atlantic alliance had come into being. For 
their part, the Soviets proceeded to establish a German Democratic 
Republic and to consolidate their position in the eastern European 
satellites. The division of Germany stood as a symbol of the unsteady 
stalemate in Europe. All illusions of four-power control had ended, 
and with them any illusion of a continuing unity of purpose which 
had originally joined together the wartime allies. 
CONSTITUTION 
I 
The name of this organization shall be The South Carolina His­
torical Association. 
II 
The objects of the Association shall be to promote historical stud­
ies in the State of South Carolina; to bring about a closer relationship 
among persons living in this State who are interested in history; and 
to encourage the preservation of historical records. 
III 
Any person approved by the executive committee may become a 
member by paying $4.00 and after the first year may continue a mem­
ber by paying an annual fee of $4.00. 
After having been a member of the Association for twenty years, 
and upon reaching the age of sixty-five, any member upon notifying 
the Secretary-Treasurer in writing, may be elected an emeritus mem­
ber by the Executive Committee. Emeritus members have all the 
rights and privileges of membership without being required to pay 
the annual dues. 
Members in student status shall pay annual dues of only $2.00. 
IV 
The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary 
and treasurer who shall be elected by ballot at each regular annual 
meeting. A list of nominations shall be presented by the executive 
committee, but nominations from the floor may be made. The officers 
shall have the duties and perform the functions customarily attached 
to their respective offices with such others as may from time to time 
be prescribed. 
V 
There shall be an executive committee made up of the officers and 
of three other members elected by ballot for a term of three years; at 
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the first election, however, one shall be elected for two years. Vacan­
cies shall be filled by election in thfe same manner at the annual meet­
ing following their occurrence. Until such time they shall be filled by 
appointment by the president. The duties of the executive committee 
shall be to fix the date and place of the annual meeting, to attend to 
the publication of the proceedings of the Association, to prepare a 
program for the annual meeting, to prepare a list of nominations for 
the officers of the Association as provided in Article IV, and such 
other duties as may be from time to time assigned to them by the 
Association. There shall be such other committees as the president 
may appoint, or be instructed to appoint, by resolution of the Asso­
ciation. 
VI 
There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time 
and place appointed by the executive committee. 
VII 
A. The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be 
known as The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Associa­
tion. It shall contain the minutes of the annual meeting together with 
such papers and documents selected by the executive committee as 
may be published without incurring a deficit. Each fifth year, begin­
ning in 1956, the Proceedings shall include a copy of the constitution 
and by-laws of the Association. 
B. All papers read at the annual meeting shall become the prop­
erty of the Association except as otherwise may be provided by the 
executive committee. 
C. The executive committee shall annually elect an editor of the 
Proceedings. He shall have authority to appoint an associate editor 
and shall be a member of the executive committee, but without vote. 
VIII 
This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the 
members present at the annual business meeting. 
